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ABSTRACT 
This paper will focus on the application of various constraints on insider trading which are 
derived from the principles of the common law and the doctrines of equity, within the 
context of New Zealand's securities markets. Accordingly, this discussion will involve an 
examination of those civil causes of action for insider trading which may be based upon a 
breach of fiduciary duty or a breach of confidence. These common law causes of action 
continue to have application and relevance in regard to insider trading which occurs in the 
securities of unlisted private or closely held companies in New Zealand by virtue of the fact 
that Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 only regulates insider trading in the 
context of listed public companies. This enquiry will seek to unearth the various failings 
and inadequacies of those common law constraints which, it is assumed, led to the 
enactment of Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. Following that, a brief 
examination will be conducted in regard to the manner by which Part I of the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988 will operate to proscribe certain insider trading practices in the 
securities of listed public companies. Finally, by way of conclusion this paper will 
analyse certain aspects of Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 in order to 
determine whether or not the various problems which have been identified with the pre-
existing common law restraints have been solved by the introduction of this remedial 
legislation. While it is conceded that the Companies Bill 1990 and various statutory 
enactments may be relevant in the context of insider trading, an administrative restriction 
upon the length of this paper has made it necessary to exclude those provisions from the 
scope of this enquiry. In order to provide the necessary background to this discussion, 
this paper will commence by considering what exactly is denoted by the phrase "insider 
trading." This discussion will then proceed with an examination of certain theoretical 
policy arguments both for and against the practice of insider trading which have been 
developed in other jurisdictions, particularly the United states. Such an investigation will 
be carried out prior to a discussion of substantive areas of law which may relate to insider 
trading, as these policy considerations will provide a valuable basis on which to consider 
the underlying purpose and effect of any such legal regulations or restrictions that may be 
imposed in the context of insider trading. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page.footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 18,500 words. 
ill 
PART I 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Nevertheless a certain class of dishonesty, dishonesty magnificent in its 
proportions, and climbing into high places, has become at the same time so 
rampant and so splendid that there seems to be reason for fearing that men 
and women will be taught to feel that dishonesty, if it can become splendid, 
will cease to be abominable. If dishonesty can live in a gorgeous place 
with pictures on all its walls, and gems in all its cupboards, with marble and 
ivory in all its corners, and can give Apician dinners, and get into 
Parliament, and deal in millions, then dishonesty is not disgraceful, and the 
man dishonest after such a fashion is not a low scoundrel." 
- Anthony Trollope (1873)1 
All of the jurisdictions to whom New Zealand has traditionally turned for a guiding hand on 
matters of law reform have enacted statutory prohibitions against the practice known as 
"insider trading".2 In the United Kingdom, the statute law creates a criminal offence.
3 In 
Australia4 and the United StatesS, legislation creates both criminal and civil consequences 
whilst in Canada, the Federal Statute provides merely a civil remedy.
6 This consensus of 
international opinion indicates the standards expected in other securities markets. 
The lack of any specific legislative proscription against insider trading in New Zealand 
prior to December 1988 prompted the Wall Street Journal to characterise New Zealand's 
securities market as the "Last Wild West Show", a reference to the relative ease with which 
profits could be made by indulging in dubious practices such as insider trading.7 The 
Australian National Companies and Securities Commission also expressed concern about 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A. Trollope, An Autobiography (Williams and Norgate Ltd (ed)., London, 1946) 308. Here
 the 
English satirist Anthony Trollope was commenting upon the financial scene in London, Engl
and, 
in 1873. In his novel, The Way We Live Now, Trollope dealt with the theme of businessm
en 
making dishonest fortunes by means of fraudulent dealing. This novel is viewed as
 an 
investigation into the 'commercial profligacy of the age' as it drew upon contemporary finan
cial 
scandals, namely the celebrated 'Bank of England Forgery' affair of 1873 (in which four yo
ung 
Americans had bilked the Bank of England for £102,000 by forging signatures on bill
s of 
exchange) and upon questionable South American loans, especially that connected with 
the 
Honduras railway scandal of 1872 (the work of Charles 'Joachim· Lefeure. whose phoney rail
way 
laid no more than fifty miles of track before failing. See, N.J. Hall, Trollope, A Biogra
phy 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991) 384-385. 
Securities Commission, "Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice" (Wellington. 19
87) 
Vol.I, para 4.9.l. 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. 
Corporations Act 1989 (Cwlth). 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 as amended by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 1984 and Ins
ider 
Trading and Security Frauds Enforcement Act 1988. 
Canadian Business Corporation Act 1973. 
The Wall Street Journal, New York, USA. 28 May 1987, 5. 
LAW UBRARY 
VlCTORIA UtJ1VERS1T·Y OF WELLlr·JCTON 
the state of New Zealand law prior to 1988, suggesting that perhaps the practice of 'insider 
trading' is one of New Zealand's invisible trans-Tasman exports. 8 In a letter to the 
Chairman of the New Zealand Securities Commission, 21 January 1987, they commented 
that: 
"On 12 January 1987 we sent you a copy of an advertisement in the 
9 January issue of the Australian Financial Review. The advertisement 
offers insider information on 'New Zealand stocks' with profits of 100% to 
1,000 % ... ( often overnight). 
We are concerned that the offer may be spurious and thus a criminal offence 
under section 125 or 126 of the Securities Industry Legislation of Australia. 
I therefore seek your assistance in providing protection for Australian 
investors. 
If the offer is genuine and any of the 'New Zealand stocks' on which 
insider information is being offered are listed on the Australian stock 
exchanges, then the Commission will also be concerned to protect 
Australian investors. In that regard our two Commissions will have to face 
such serious issues as whether to suspend Australian trading in the 
securities of New Zealand companies listed on the Australian stock 
exchanges until such time as the Commission is able to take steps to satisfy 
itself that investors in the Australian market are being protected from 
exploitation by insider trading emanating from New Zealand."9 
In the face of such a diminution of New Zealand's reputation in international business 
circles, the then Minister of Justice released the New Zealand Securities Commission's 
report on Insider Trading in December 1987 . In doing so, the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer 
stated that insider trading was a morally repugnant practice and that for the long term 
confidence of investors, New Zealand's securities markets could not continue to present the 
image of a last frontier for those wishing to manipulate the price of securities for their own 
financial gain 10. The Securities Commission 's report advised the Government to take 
effective action against such conduct by introducing a coherent set of legislative sanctions 
and remedies based on the US concept11 known as "disclose or abstain": 12 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
"An insider who has price-sensitive information that comes to him, or is 
generated by him, by reason of his position as an insider, should be 
prohibited from dealing or tipping until the information is published or is 
C. Patterson , " Insider Trading" [ 1988] NZLJ 70. 71. 
National Companies m1d Securities Commission of Australia - letter to Chairman of New Zealand 
Securities Commission. 21 January 1987; in C. Patterson. " Insider Trading." above n.8, 71. 
( 1988) 25 NZPD 5280. 
See, e.g .. Re Cady. Rob erts & Co. 40 SEC 907 (1961); SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur 401 F 2d 
833 (l 968). 
Securities Commission. ''Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice," above n.2. Vol. I. 
para 3.1. 
2 
otherwise reflected in market prices. While he is inhibited from disclosing, 
he should also be inhibited from dealing unless and until the market price 
has adjusted to reflect the information." 
These recommendations were accepted by Parliament and enacted in the form of Part l of 
the Securities Amendment Act 1988 ("the Act") which came into force on 22 December 
1988. This Act introduced for the first time in New Zealand an express statutory 
prohibition against insider trading in the securities of a listed "public issuer." 13 The 
impetus for this enactment seems to have been founded upon the widespread belief that the 
law as it existed in New Zealand prior to 1988 did not provide effective coverage of the 
possible situations in which insider trading might occur. 14 
This paper represents a critical appraisal of the validity of that assumption, by focusing 
upon the application of various pre-existing constraints on insider trading which are derived 
from the principles of the common law and the doctrines of equity, within the context of 
New Zealand's securities markets. Accordingly, this discussion will involve an 
examination of those civil causes of action for insider trading which may be based upon a 
breach of fiduciary duty or a breach of confidence. These common law causes of action 
continue to have application and relevance in regard to insider trading which occurs in the 
securities of unlisted private or closely held companies in New Zealand by virtue of the fact 
that Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 only regulates insider trading in the 
context of listed public companies. 15 The fundamental purpose of this enquiry will be to 
unearth the various failings and inadequacies of those common law constraints which, it is 
assumed, led to New Zealand's securities markets being characterised as the "Last Wild 
West Show." Following that, a brief examination will be conducted in regard to the 
13 
14 
15 
See, below n.268. See, also P. Ratner & C. Quinn, Insider Trading , New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar, March 1990, I. 
See, above n. 7, n.8 and n. JO. Prior to the introduction of the Securities Amendment Act I 988. 
the Chairman of the Securities Commission, Colin Patterson, asserted that there were four strong 
forces at work to prevent insider trading in New Zealand: 
"First, we have the pressure of infonned opinion rmd the strength of reputation which is. perhaps. 
the strongest inducement to honourable behaviour. 
Secondly, we have codes of conduct such as the rules of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. and the 
opinions of organisations such as the Institute of Directors and the Listed Companies Association. 
Thirdly, we have rules of law, developed by judges from the principles of common law ,md the 
doctrines of equity, which insist that profits obtained in breach of duty cannot he kept. 
Fourthly, we have some statute law on the subject, notably the provisions of the Companies Act 
1955 requiring the disclosure by directors of their holdings and dealings in the shares of the 
company in which they hold office." See. C. Patterson. "Insider Trading and the Director"; in J. 
FtUTar (ed), Contemporary Issues in Company Law (CCH (NZ) Ltd., Auckl,md, 1987) 173. 
However. the Companies Bill 1990. which intends to provide coverage in relation to both public 
and private companies. proposes to cover similar ground to that covered under the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988 (which only applies to publicly listed companies. see below n.268). Sec, 
below n.16. 
3 
manner by which Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 will operate to proscribe 
certain insider trading practices in the securities of listed public companies. Finally, by 
way of conclusion this paper will analyse certain aspects of Part I of the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988 in order to determine whether or not the various problems which 
have been identified with the pre-existing common law restraints have been solved by the 
introduction of this remedial legislation. While it is conceded that the Companies Bill 
199016 and various statutory enactments 17 may be relevant in the context of insider 
16 
17 
The Companies Bill 1990 (introduced into Parliament on 5 September 1990) imposes general 
duties in relation to all actions of directors. These restate the common law duties of good faith and 
care and also clarify and reform the general duties of directors in relation to a company's 
confidential information, dealing in a company's shares and self interested transactions. The 
Companies Bill will be of relevance to the problem of insider trading as: 
(i) The Companies Bill would apply to both public listed companies and private unlisted 
companies. Whereas the Securities Amendment Act 1988 only applies to public listed companies. 
See, Law Commission, "Report No.9: Company Law Reform and Restatement" (Wellington, 
1989) para 538. 
(ii) In the case of use of company information by directors (clause 123), disclosure of share 
dealings by directors (clause 124) and restrictions on share dealings by directors (clause 125) ; an 
employee receiving confidential information concerning the company, and nominating shareholders 
with whose directions and instructions a nominee director is required or accustomed to act in 
respect of their duties and powers as a director, are to be treated as directors for the purposes of 
clauses 123, 124 and 125. 
(iii) Directors who are interested in a transaction or proposed transaction with the company are 
required to to disclose such an interest on the interests register ( clauses 117 and 118). Furthermore. 
a transaction entered into by the company may be avoided by the company within 3 months of the 
transaction being disclosed to all the shareholders (by means of the company's annual report or 
otherwise), if the company does not receive fair value under such a transaction (clause 119). 
(iv) Directors are required to maintain in confidence the company's confidential information 
(clause 123). 
(v) Directors of a company who deals in shares or other securities issued by the company, are 
required to disclose such dealings to the board of directors and enter the particulars of the 
transaction in the interests register (clause 124). 
(vi) Under the Companies Bill, a director of a company who possesses confidential price-sensitive 
information in their capacity as a director, which is material to the assessment of the value of the 
shares or other securities issued by the company or related company, may only deal in such 
securities if the consideration they provided for the acquisition or disposal is "fair' in value, in light 
of that confidential price-sensitive information possessed by the director (clause 125). 
The following statutory provisions may have relevance to insider tracling: 
(i) Section 195A of the Companies Act 1955 (which replaced the previous s.195 of the 
Companies Act 1955, as from I July 1988) requires the company to keep a register in which every 
officer of the company must disclose their interests in shares and debentures of that company and 
associated companies. This has relevance for the issue of detecting any untoward proceedings by 
directors and other company officers in securities transactions: 
(ii) The New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Requirements (issued in July 1989) imposes an 
obligation on companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (and their subsidaries, officers 
and associates; see s.2.2) to disclose certain relevant information to the Exchange. By virtue of 
s.2.1 these requirements are declared to be a contract enforceable against each issuer for the benefit 
of every person who is or was a holder of quoted securities of that public issuer in the period in 
which the issuer was or is listed on the Exchange; and the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 shall apply 
accordingly (subject to s.2.1.1 ). 
(iii) Sections 250 and 266 of the Crimes Act will also apply such that. a person may not make 
a false statement which induces a person to buy or sell shares. However, this will not apply to 
anyone who makes no statement but merely trades on the basis of inside information (e.g., in the 
context of the stock exchange where transactions may be conducted in the absence of any face-to-
face negotiations); 
4 
trading, an administrative restriction upon the length of this paper has made it necessary to 
exclude those provisions from the scope of this discussion. 
In order to provide the necessary background to this discussion, this paper will commence 
by considering what exactly is denoted by the phrase "insider trading." This discussion 
will then proceed with an examination of certain theoretical policy arguments both for and 
against the practice of insider trading which have been developed in other jurisdictions, 
particularly the United states. 18 Such an investigation will be carried out prior to a 
discussion of substantive areas of law which may relate to insider trading, as these policy 
considerations will provide a valuable basis on which to consider the underlying purpose 
18 
(iv) A company director, or other insider, who accepts payment in return for disclosing inside 
information commits an offence under Section 4 of the Secret Commissions Act 1910. Sect
ion 3 
of that Act also makes it an offence for an outsider to offer such a payment to directors or 
other 
insiders; 
(v) Section 209 of the Companies Act 1955 provides an opportunity for persons beleiving that 
"the affairs of the company have been or are being or are likely to be conducted in a manner th
at is, 
or any act or acts of the company have been or are likely to be, oppressive, unf
airly 
discriminatory, or unfairly prejudical,"to make an application to the court for an order. The C
ourt 
may " ... make such order as it thinks fit.whether for-
(a) Regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future; or 
(b) Restricting or forbidding the carrying out of any proposed act; or 
(c) The purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members o
f the 
company or by the company and, in the case of a purchase by the company,for the 
reduction accordingly of the company's capital; or 
(d) Directing the company to institute, prosecute, defend, or discontinue Court proceed
ings, 
or authorising a member or members of the company to institute , prosecute, defend, or 
discontinue Court proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company." 
Whether s.209 could apply to the context of insider trading was recently tested by the New Zea
land 
High Court in Cotterall v Fidelity Life Assurance Company Ltd (1987) 3 NZCLC ~100-055
. In 
this case a director and another major shareholder had learned that another company was inter
ested 
in acquiring shares in their company at $10 per share. The director then negotiated with ano
ther 
shareholder and purchased all of her shares at $5.90 a share, without disclosing such in
side 
information. The director subsequently sold the shares for $10 and received a substantial p
rofit. 
The plaintiff who had sold the shares at $5.90 sought relief under s.209. The Court held
 that 
s.209 would not apply as it is only available to existing shareholders and not former sharehold
ers. 
It is interesting to note that the factual picture presented by the Cotterall case was later descr
ibed 
by the New Zealand Securities Commission as being, "as plain a case of insider trading as
 it is 
possible to conceive"; see Securities Commission, "Insider Trading: Report to the Minist
er of 
Justice," above n.2, Vol I. para 11.10.14. 
(vi) Where pre-contractual negotiations for the sale and purchase of securities is conducted
 in a 
face-to-face type situation (i.e. a private company share sale scenario rather than the sale
 of a 
public company's shares through the stock exchange) and the insider trader has elicited the sa
le or 
purchase of those securities by means of a misrepresentation. the representee (i.e. the victi
m of 
such insider trading) may bring an action for damages under either s.6 of the Contractual Reme
dies 
Act 1979 (which applies the contractual measure for assessing damages) or s.9 of the Fair Tra
ding 
Act 1986 (which applies the tortious measure for assessing damages). However, it mus
t be 
pointed out that non-disclosure of material information in pre-contractual negatiations will 
only 
amount to a misrepresentation in very limited circumstances. See, J.F. Burrows. J.N. Finn, S. 
Todd, Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (7 (NZ) ed., Butterworths, Wellington, l 988) 
288-
293. 
See, e.g. H.G. Manne. Insider Trading and the Stock market (Collier -MacMillan Ltd, New Y
ork, 
1966). 
5 
and effect of any such legal regulations or restrictions that may be imposed in the context of 
insider trading. 
( 1) WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING ? 
To understand the nature of insider trading it is important to appreciate the value of 
information in the financial markets. Information is what the market relies on to determine 
the price of a particular commodity which is the subject of that market. In insider trading 
cases this will primarily be the market for company securities. 19 According to the 
"efficient capital markets hypothesis,"20 all available information about a company's 
financial prospects is fully and virtually instantaneously reflected in the market price of the 
company's securities. In an efficient developed market, therefore, investors can be 
19 
20 
Insider trading is a term that can apply to the misuse of price sensitive information concerning 
company assets and company performance without necessarily relating to a company's securities. 
However, in New Zealand section 2 of the the Securities Amendment Act 1988 has limited the 
meaning of "insider trading" to the trading of securities, such that: 
"Inside Information" in relation to a public issuer, means information which-
(a) Is not publicly available; and 
(b) Would, or would be likely to, affect materially the price of the securities of the public issuer if 
it was publicly available. 
The use of information is central to the efficient working of the capital market. In this context the 
concept of efficiency relates to the prices and values associated with all securities. An efficient 
capital market is said to be one in which prices are accurate signals for allocating financial capital 
to physical assets. such as buildings, plant and equipment. This means in tum, that the returns or 
rewards on securities offered in capital markets will reflect a general level in the market adjusted for 
the risk associated with each security. That return on individual securities is best conceived as a 
normal return. This does not mean that actual returns do not vary around that normal return; only 
that any departures are random without persistent bias, positive or negative, around the nonn. 
This concept is what is meant by the "efficient capital markets hypothesis." See, E.F. Fama. 
"Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Emperical Work" (1970) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383. According to the "strong form" of market efficiency the market price fully reflects 
all available information, including unpublished information. Thus, insiders cannot consistently 
out-perform the market because prices already reflect inside information. This assertion obviates 
the need to regulate insider trading since if prices fully reflect all available information, non-
insiders who deal at the market price will enjoy the equivalent of complete knowledge which 
includes the unpublished information known to the insider. According to "strong form efficiency," 
inside information only confers an advantage on an insider when that insider knows that no-one 
else has the information. As where the information is known to others and another insider trades 
ahead of the insider in question, the market price will already have begun to impound the 
information. On this analysis, when the market price fully reflects all available information, but 
an insider believes it does not. the insider's performance will be inferior to that of unsophisticated 
investors who trade on the assumption of "strong form efficiency." The insider's purchases will 
increase the price beyond that justified by the information and the insider will pay more than the 
security is worth. Except for that insider's mistaken buying pressure, the price will fall to that 
dictated by the information. Hence, "strong form efficiency·· should be encouraged because rather 
than placing othe1; investors at a disadvantage, insider trading contributes to market efficiency and 
benefits non-insiders by increasing the flow of valuable information to the market. See.W. 
Hogan, "In~r Trading," ( I 988) 6 Company and Securities Law Journal 39, 40-41; J. Suter. 
Insider Dealing in Britain (Butterworths, London. 1989) 23-25. 
6 
confident that the market price accurately reflects the company's prospects and this in turn 
ensures the efficient allocation of capital within that market.
21 
It is apparent to even the most casual observer that the market will respond to the release of 
financial information and alter the market price of company securities accordingly, good 
news moving the price up, bad news moving it down. A party indulging in the practice 
known as "insider trading" (or insider dealing) designs to trade in a company's securities 
while they are in possession of such price sensitive information which has not yet been 
released to the market, and therefore has not yet had an effect on the market price of these 
securities. For example, where the share price of company X is presently $5 and a certain 
party gains possession of price sensitive information relating to an oil find by that crpany 
which will push its share price to $ l 0, that party will aim to deal in these shares at $5, $6 
or $7, indeed any price lower than the market price these shares will reach on the 
information being made public. On the other hand, if the shares stand at $10 and that party 
learns that the oil well has run dry, then their aim is to sell their shares in the market at $10 
before the news is released and the share price falls back to some figure below tb.aL_ 
Information may become reflected in prices in various ways. There may be a specific 
statement or disclosure to the market. That is appropriate for some kinds of information, 
such as profits, losses, and dividends. But it is by no means appropriate in all cases. For 
example, where a company obtains a lucrative contract, it may not be appropriate to publish 
any information pertaining to it. Nevertheless, the effect of the contract will, in due course, 
become reflected in security prices as a response to the increased profitability of the 
company, without any specific disclosure necessarily being made as to the existence or 
terms of the contract. 
It is a difficult question to decide whether any particular item of information has affected 
prices or is likely to affect them. It may be noted that some information proclaims its price-
sensitivity from its nature. Typically, this includes information of a possible or pending 
takeover, capital reconstruction or major new undertaking. Another important element is 
lapse of time, especially in relation to information about a trend, whether favourable or 
unfavourable, affecting the company. For example, there may be a general decline in the 
construction industry apparent to all observers which may have a profound effect on a 
particular company which is not for the time being accurately reflected by the price of that 
company's securities. This information as to the effect of such a trend on that particular 
company may be price-sensitive and known only to insiders. 
21 See. R.J. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman , "The Mechanisms of Markel Efficiency" 70 Va L Rev 549, 
554 (1984). 
7 
The operation of the securities market in New Zealand has been said to rest upon two basic 
principles:22 
(a) Disclosure of all material information; and 
(b) Orderly procedures for transacting business, whether by subscription and allotment 
or sale and purchase. 
Insider trading is essentially a problem of non-disclosure; "a person whose position 
provides him with access to information that indicates a disparity between the value of a 
corporation's securities and the price at which they may be acquired or disposed of acts on 
the information before it becomes available to those with whom he trades in order to obtain 
for himself without risk, the benefit of his early knowledge. It can occur, and has, in the 
shares of both closely held, private companies and widely held, public companies"
23 listed 
on the stock exchange. 24 
"Insiders" (i.e., parties in possession of unreleased price-sensitive information) are usually 
persons 25 connected with the company whose securities are being traded (e.g. a . 
director26), but it can also include recipients27 of information from the aforementioned 
party (i.e. a tippee). However the classic form of insider trading usually involves a direct 
transaction in which a director or company officer purchases shares in their company, 
possibly through an agent so that they may conceal their identity.
28 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
J. Farrar & M. Russell, Company Law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1985) 345. 
P. Anisman, Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and Alternatives 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986) 2. 
See, e.g., Coleman v Myers [ 1977) 2 NZLR 225, discussed below at n.137; SEC v Dirks I 03 
S.Ct 3255 (1983), discussed below at n.163. 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.2: " Person" includes a corporation sole, a company or other 
body corporate (whether incorporated in New Zealand or elsewhere), an unincorporated body of 
persons, a public body, and a Government Department. 
See, e.g., Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.3(l)(b). 
See, e.g., Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.3(l)(c) and (e). 
See, e.g., Strong v R epide 213 US 410 (1909). In that case the plaintiff had sold shares in a 
company to a person who, unknown to her, was the agent of a director in the company. The 
director was aware at the time of purchase of the shares of an impending sale of that company's 
land to the Phillipine Government. Indeed, the director was acting as the chief negotiator in the 
transaction , which was duly completed after the plaintiff had sold her shares to the agent of the 
director. and which subsequently produced a subst.<'U1tial profit for that director. 
" 
8 
Professor Warren Hogan of the University of Sydney's Department of Economics has 
identified two possible approaches to the definition of inoider trading. 
29 The first 
approach reflects the notion of property rights in information, so that insider trading is 
defined as:30 ----
" ... the use of information, not publicly available, by a participant in a 
securities transaction whose access to that information is derived directly or 
indirectly from a fiduciary relationship and giving the participant and 
associates a financial advantage over others. The advantage may be 
secured from trading in the securities of the company in which the fiduciary 
relationship is established, or in other companies whose market values may 
be influenced if confidential information held by the initial company were 
acted upon." 
According to this definition the owners have a property interest in the information held by 
the company so that those persons breaching a fiduciary relationship might gain at the 
expense of the owners, namely s~holde!:§. However, the use of insider information 
does not cause a 'loss of wealth' for all shareholders.
31 Only those shareholders who sold 
at the time _when trading was being conducted on the basis of inside information might be 
said to have 'lost wealth'; an interpretation resting upon an assumption that the security in 
question has subsequently risen in price after the transaction. However, when the 
prospect is for a fall in the price of the relevant security, the only loss of wealth resulting 
from insider trading is experienced by those buying shares in the company prior to the 
information becoming public. 
The second approach reflects a principle of equality of access to information about 
securities, whereby all participants, actual and potential, are given the same opportunity to 
gain information on any one security traded in a market. This approach sets aside the 
property concept, as information is not perceived as the property of the company as an 
individual legal entity, or as contributing to the wealth of its owners (i.e. the 
shareholders). Under this approach insider trading may be defined as:
32 
29 
30 
3 1 
3 2 
" ... the use of information, not publicly available by any participant in a 
securities transaction to the financial advantage of that participant and 
W. Hogan, "Insider Trading,''above n.20, 39. 
W. Hogan. "Insider Trading," above n.20. 39-40. 
D.W. Carlton and D.R. Fischel. "The Regulation of Insider Trading," 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857,
 868 
(1983). 
W. Hogan. ' 'Insider Trading," above n.20. 40. 
" 
9 
associates over other participants. The breadth of this definition implies 
restraining use of any confidential information from whatever the source 
and however it was devised." 
A comparison between these two suggested approaches shows the difference between 
them. The ' property approach' is about using information, developed within fiduciary 
relationships of a company, to financial advantage. The 'equal access' approach requires 
that the same information about securities should be available to all participants, actual and 
potential, in the market. The former acknowledges the connection between information 
and the wealth of the shareholders, whereas the later denies its existence or, at the.. ver)l-
least, its primacy for the workings of securities markets. 
It will be seen that both of these jurisprudential approaches to the problem of defining 
insider trading are reflected within the present constraints upon insider trading in New 
Zealand's securities markets. This should become apparent after an examination of both, 
pre-existing remedies for insider trading and the additional remedies provided under Part I 
of the Securities Amendment Act 1988.33 
33 See, below n.8 1. n. 179, n.266, n.271. 
" 
10 
PART II 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO 
' 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
The initial question of whether insider trading should be regulated has given rise to 
considerable debate. The following discussion of theoretical considerations relating to 
insider trading will provide a valuable insight into the underlying purpose and effect of any 
such regulation upon insider trading. It is certainly not universally agreed that insider 
dealing is reprehensible, for while some commentators would view it as the unacceptable 
face of capitalism34, others see nothing wrong with it and indeed even think it should be 
encoura_ged. This latter view was first advanced in Professor Manne' s 1966 publication, 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market35 , which asserted that the practice is, in the economic 
sense, positively beneficial and ought not to be prohibited. Since then the debate has raged 
between those who would support Professor Manne' s position or variations thereof, and 
consider the problem in terms of economic efficiency alone and those who, relying on 
notions of fairness, market integrity and morality, would argue for prohibition.36 This 
debate is worth considering here, for the lack of consensus as to the merits and wisdom of 
constraining this practice has important implications in terms of whether the various 
remedies and methods of enforcement to be discussed in this paper, are of an appropriate 
nature to be applied in this area. 
34 
35 
36 
D. Sugarman, "The Regulation of Insider Dealing"; in B. Rider (ed), The Regulation of the British 
Securities Industry (Oyez Publishing Ltd, London, 1979) 62. 
H.G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (Collier-MacMillan Ltd, New York, 1966). 
The literature on this debate is voluminous and only the more important contributions are noted 
here. The starting point must be H.G. Manne 's 1966 text, hereafter cited as Manne (1966), above 
n.35, which provoked a number of responses; see, J. Hetherington , " Insider Trading and the Logic 
of the Law" Wis. L. Rev.720 (1967); R. Schotland, "Unsafe at any Price. A Reply to Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market," 53 Va. L.Rev. 1425 ( 1967); M. Mendelson, "The 
Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered," 117 U.Pa .L.Rev. 470 (1969). Manne 's response to 
these criticisms can be found in, "Insider Trading and the Law Professors," 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547 
(1970), hereafter cited as H.G. Manne (1970). Other important contributions to the debate include; 
W. H. Painter, "Inside Information, Growing Pains for the Development of a Federal Corporation 
Law under Rule lOb-5." 65 Colum. L.Rev. 1361 (1965); C. Stone, "Fashioning a Lid for 
Pandora's Box ," Securities L.Rev 205 (1970); V. Brudney, "Insiders, Outsiders and Infonnational 
Advantages." 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322 (1979); M. Dooley. "Enforcement of Insider Trading 
Restrictions," 66 Va. L. Rev. I (1980); K. Scott, "Insider Trading, Rule lOb-5. Disclosure and 
Corporate Privacy," 9 J. Leg. Studies 801 (1980); D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel, "The Regulation 
of Insider Trading," 35 Stan. L. Rev.857 (1983). 
l l ' 
"The insiders' gain is not made at the expense of anyone".3
7 
An initial difficulty in terms of justifying any such constraints is that it is not easy to 
' 
identify an individual victim of the insider; indeed it is frequently asserted that this is a 
victimless crime.38 This may not be the case if the insider trading has occurred in a face-
to-face transaction where it may be possible to establish some misrepresentation or some 
deliberate inducement to the other party (hereafter referred to as an outsider) to deal, on the 
part of the insider. _However, most insider trading talces place on impersonal, anonymous, 
stock exchanges where it is impossible to establish any relationship between the insider and 
the outsider other than the coincidental one of having both been in the market at the same 
time. Individuals who deal in such impersonal markets have decided to do so voluntarily, 
without any inducement from the insider, quite independently of anything which the insider 
does, and in full knowledge of the price at which they are dealing.3
9 Such individuals 
cannot say that any loss suffered by them is caused by the insider trading.
40 Their loss 
has been caused by thtinitial non-discl.9sure of the irrft>rmation in question by the relevant 
corporation and the subsequent market readjustment on disclosure.
41 This loss will occur 
regardless of whether insiders have dealt or not, for in any event the outsider would still 
have dealt in the market and would have sustained the same losses.~
2 As an investor's 
decision to sell .or to purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is also secretly buying or 
selling in the open market. If the insider neither trades nor discloses material non-public 
information, one can nevertheless expect the investor to pursue their trading plan. To be 
sure, sellers are naturally disadvantaged by the non-disclosure of good news, just as 
buyers are disadvantaged by the non-disclosure of bad news.
43 
The outsider's mistalce has been in independently reaching a decision to deal on the basis of 
information which was not wholly up to date, but then share ownership invol"leS risk and 
one of the risks is that someone else in the market is better informed than yourself.
44 In 
37 
38 
3. 9 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
H.G.Manne (1966), ~bove n.35, 61. 
H.G.Manne (1966), above n.35, 61. 
See. M. Dooley, above n.36, 33. 
See, J. Hetherington, above n.36. 723-725. 
See, C. Stone,above n. 36, 211. 
See, J. Hetherir\gton.above n. 36, 733. An outsider may perhaps be regarded as the 'victim' of an 
insider if it could be shown that the non-disclosure of price sensitive information has been 
deliberately planned by the insider in order to facilitate his own dealing; however. many insiders are 
not in a position to dictate the timing of disclosure. 
J.D. Cox, "An Economic Perspective of Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement in New 
Zealand" ( 1990) Canta. L. R. 268, 269. 
See, W. Painter, above n.36, 1386: " ... part of the penalty which you must pay, perhaps for 
engaging in the rough and tumble of financial life." See also. K. Scott. above n.36, 808: " ... the 
game is. after all, voluntary." In any event, in the present day secutities markets in New Zealand 
investors are predominantly institvtionaI investors who are well able to look after themselves; see 
12 
any event, Professor Manne argues that, far from having been disadvantaged from t
rading 
in a market where insiders are active, the outsider will have benefited from their acti
vities, 
which will have moved the price of the securities in the right direction, thus ensurin
g that 
the outsider gets a better bargain than would otherwise have been the case.
45 Thus, not 
only may we lack credible plaintiffs as far as insider trading is concerned, we
 have 
supposed "victims" who have actually "benefited" from the activity. 
Market Egalitarianism 
However, even though it is not possible to show a direct causal link
46 between the 
activities of the insider, the decision of the outsider to deal, and the loss incurred, it
 might 
still be possible to regard the outsider as a victim in the sense that he is a victim
 of an 
~ formational advantag~ possessed by other people in the market, of which he is i
gnorant, 
and which he could not1rnve obtained. This, it is argued, is contrary to the idea of m
arket 
egalitarianism which requires that all_investors tradffig on impersonal exchanges s
hould 
have relatively equal access to information.47 The aim of securities regulation is to e
nsure, 
as far as practically possible, that the market operates freely on the basis of eq
uality 
between buyer and seller. Of course, it is accepted that it is not always possible 
to put 
people on a co;npletely equal footing, for there will always be informational adva
ntages 
based on superior experience and foresight.
48 In a sense, therefore, inside information is 
always present but, it is argued, it should be possible to remove informational adva
ntages 
achieved unfairly through access to information which cannot be obtained by othe
rs and 
which in all probability is being used by the insider in breach of some fiduciary or
 other 
duty.49 
Opponents of regulation see this goal of market egalitarianism as unrealistic for, they 
argue, 
it could not be achieved other than through the immediate disclosure of all informati
on, to 
ensure that all investors in the market place are informed and dealing on an equal bas
is. In 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
J. Farrar & M. Russell. "The impact of Institutional Investment on Company Law" (19
84) 5 Co. 
Law 107. 
See, H.G. Manne (1966) above n.35, 77-110. However, the outsider still does n
ot get the price 
they would have got had the information been disclosed. 
The absence of a causal link and an identifiable victim does not necessarily mean 
that the practice 
should not be regulated. although it may indicate that remedies based on
 a rationale of 
compensation for an identifiable injury may not be appropriate. See, C. Stone, above n.3
6, 212. 
See, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur. 401 F 2d 833, 848 (1968): " ... Rule [!Ob-5) is 
based in policy 
on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors tradin
g on impersonal 
exchanges have relatively equal access to material infonnation" (Emphasis adde
d). See also, L. 
Loss, "The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate Insiders in the
 United States" 
( 1970) 33 MLR 36. 
See, K. Scott.above n. 36, 805. 
See, V. Brudney. above n.36. " 
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practice, however, not even the quickest, most prompt, disclosure would en
sure this result. 
All it would do is create another category of insider ("near insiders" as they
 are sometimes 
called), made up of the professionals in the market; i.e., merchant ba
nkers, brokers, 
analysts, institutional investors etc, who are in a position to respond at o
nce to any new 
information. 50 They would profit along with the insiders while the re
mainder of the 
market being unable to respond immediately, would continue to be at a disa
dvantage. 
Investor Confidence 
Despite the fae~ that market egalitarianism is perhaps an unattainable obje
ctive, the most 
fundamental goal in regulating the securities market is surely the enc
ouragement of 
efficiency51 in that market and the maintenance of investor confidence.
52 It is important 
that nothing be permitted to impair investors confidence in the market as "a
 clean place" in 
which to do business.53 The danger is that if investors perceive thems
elves to be at a 
disadvantage, if they are concerned that they may be harmed by insider tr
ading, or if they 
are unhappy about being in a market where some of the players hav
e a substantial 
informational advantage over them, then they may withdraw from the 
market and so 
decrease its liquidity.54 This loss of confidence may be particularly felt by 
the company in 
whose securities the insider trading occurred, for while it may be difficult t
o see any direct 
injury to the company as a consequence of insider trading
55 there may be indirect injury to 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
See, D. W. Carlton & D. R. Fischel, above n.36, 880. 
The term 'efficiency ' may be used in three senses; allocational, ext
ernal and internal. An 
allocationally efficient market is one which allocates capital to users in su
ch a way that those who 
can make the best use of capital are favoured by the market in terms of bei
ng allocated more capital 
than those who make a poorer use of capital. In an externally efficient m
arket, prices fully reflect 
available information. Internal efficiency is concerned with whether tran
saction costs are so high 
as to discourage dealing by outsiders, who keep the market externally eff
icient, and whether those 
not required to bear transaction costs make excessive returns. though n
ecessary to allocational 
efficiency, external efficiency is not synonymous with allocational effi
ciency since allocational 
efficiency also requires internal efficiency. The distinction between extern
al and internal efficiency 
is more fully considered in; R.R West. "Two Kinds of Market Effic
iency," (1975) 31 Fin. 
Analysis J. 30. 
This has been a primary concern of the New Zealand Securities Com
mission; see. Securities 
Commission, ''Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice .. , above 
n.2. Vol.I, para 4.4. l. 
In stipulating " investor confidence" as one of the objectives of the securi
ties markets, the British 
Government's 1985 White Paper on Investor Protection stated that such a
 market:" ... must inspire 
confidence in issuers and investors by ensuring that the financial services
 sector is. and is seen to 
be, a 'clean' place to do business ." See, L.C.B. Gower, "A New Frame
work for Investor 
Protection" (l 985) Cmnd 9432. HMSO, London. 21. 
See. D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel. above n.36. 866. on the importance of ma
rket liquidity. The 
catastrophic consequences of a loss of investor confidence in the marke
ts, however caused, are 
clearly shown by the stock market crash in October 1987. Anything w
hich might contribute to 
such a loss of confidence by investors must therefore be prevented. 
Although direct injury to the company can occur in some cases as where.
 for example. the insider 
trader alerts the public to an ore find by a company. thereby forcing up 
the price of surrounding 
land before the company has an opportunity to acquire it: see e.g., SEC v
 Texas Gulf Sulphur 40 l 
F 2d 833 (l 968). 
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its reputation for integrity and probity, thereby damaging its standing in c
apital markets.56 
Insider trading may, therefore, make capital raising more expensive for a c
ompany.57 Thus 
it would follow that in order, to avoid such a result and to ensure tha
t efficiency and 
confidence is maintained, it will be necessary to constrain insider trad
ing. This will 
remove any incentive for the insider to delay the disclosure of informati
on to the market, 
thereby enhancing the flow of information which will in turn ensure that
 investors can be 
satisfied that the pricing of the securities by the market is an accurate bas
is upon which to 
reach their investment decisions.58 
Professor Manrr~ would deny, however, that insiders have any incent
ive to delay the 
disclosure of information, beyond delaying it just long enough for the
m to trade. He 
argues that it is in their interest to have it disclosed as soon as possible afte
r they have dealt, 
thus ensuring their immediate profit.
59 In any event he noted that insider traders are rarely 
people the people with the ability to determine the timing of the disc
losure. 60 In his 
opinion, therefore, prohibition is not needed to ensure a flow of informatio
n to the market. 
Market Efficiency 
Indeed, those against regulation would argue that it is the prohibition and n
ot the practice of 
insider dealing which inhibits the flow of information to the market place.
 It does this in a 
number of ways. Firstly insiders who have information do not trade up
on it. Thus, the 
prohibition may actually create an incentive for insider trading as it caus
es the insider to 
suppress such information which in turn makes the information valua
ble. Secondly, 
individuals who may or may not be within the ambit of any such prohibit
ion do not trade, 
because of doubts as to their position, given the typically uncertain applica
tion and scope of 
such legislation . Thirdly, such a prohibition deprives individuals of 
the incentive to 
acquire valuable information, for they are denied the opportunity to s
ell the acquired 
information to others or to profit directly by trading themselves.
61 Fourthly, prohibition 
forces speculators out of the market and they play an economically i
mportant role in 
stabilising prices; as speculators tend to buy when the price is low and sel
l when it is high, 
thereby forcing the price of the securities within a narrower range. 
62 Insiders are 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Such possible damage was accepted in Diamond v Oreamuno 248 NE 2d 91
0. 912 (I 969); but see 
contra, Brophy v Cities Service Co 70 A (2d) (1948): Freeman v Decio 584
 F 2d 186 (1978). 
See, M. Mendelson. above n.36, 477. 
See, M. Mendelson, above n.36. 473-476; R. Schotland, above n.36. 1448.
 
See, H.G . Manne (1966), above n.35, 104-105: D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel,
 above n.36, 879. 
See. H.G. Manne (1966). above n.35 . 104-105: D.W.Carlton & D.R. Fischel, 
above n.36. 879. 
See, D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel. above n.36, 885. 
See, H.K. Wu. "An Economist Looks at Sectionl6 of the Securities Ex
change Act 1934," 68 
Colum. L. Rev. 260 266 (1968). 
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speculators par excellence and forcing them out of the market in this way
 only increases 
instability within the market by denying insiders the ability to gradually ease
 prices towards 
the correct price. 63 
This view of insider trading as a mechanism which, far from resulting in the
 withholding of 
information and the endangering of the efficient operation of the market ac
tually increases 
investor confidence in the pricing mechanism of the market is one olf Pro
fessor Manne's 
main arguments in favour of the practice. 
64 Insider trading in his view moves prices in the 
right direction towards the level correctly reflecting all the real facts abou
t the company, 
thus ensuring that capital resources will be properly allocated. Not all co
mmentators are 
convinced, however, for while insider trading may move prices in the right 
direction it does 
so derivatively through price and trade decoding as the market deduces the p
resence of such 
information from the trading activity. This can only occur slowly and spo
radically and is 
dependent upon such factors as the ability of other people to identify the
 fact of insider 
trading taking place in particular securities from the surrounding "noise" of
 other trading in 
the market. 65 Indeed, as Gilson & Kraakman noted, if one really belie
ved that insider 
trading does have such a beneficial effect on market pricing, then the best w
ay of achieving 
this is to provide for immediate disclosure of the fact that insiders are dealin
g so that instead 
of such a slow derivative process, there would be a much quicker reaction b
y the market. 66 
Self-Regulation by Companies 
It is equally difficult to assert that insider trading diminishes investor conf
idence in those 
particular companies where it is known or suspected to occur, so making i
t more difficult 
and expensive for them to raise capital. Carlton & Fischel make the poin
t that if insider 
trading did harm companies in this way, then there would be an incentive fo
r them to show 
the markets that they have taken steps internally to prevent insider trading 
in order to give 
themselves a competitive edge over companies which do not take such 
steps. 67 In the 
absence of any evidence that companies take such steps, they argue, 
it is clear that 
companies do not regard themselves as harmed in the markets. To the lim
ited extent that 
companies in New Zealand have taken such steps, they have done so as a r
esponse to such 
requirements as ss.195 and 195A of the Companies Act 1955 , the I
nsider Trading 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
See, J. Hetherington, above n.36. 277. 
H.G. Manne (1966), above n.35. 77-110. See also. D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fisch
el. above n. 36, 
868. ./ 
See, R. Schotland. above n.36, 1443-1449; R.J. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman, abo
ve n.21. 572-579. 
R.J. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman, above n.21. 632. 
D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel. above n.36, 863-866. 
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(Approved Procedure for Company Officers) Notice 199
1,68 the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange Guidelines for Securities Transactions by Director
s (March 1982) and the so-
called "Chinese Wall" exemptions for insider trading li
ability under the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988,69 but not it seems, as a consequen
ce of any perception that the 
absence of such provisions has harmed them in the market. 
Commercial Morality 
The net result is that the economic arguments do suggest 
that insider trading is not so 
obviously detrimental that it needs to be constrained or pro
hibited. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no justification for constraint, for as Sc
hotland observed: 
"Even if we found that unfettered insider trading would brin
g an economic 
gain, we might still forgo that gain in order to secure a sto
ck market and 
intracorporate relationships that satisfy such non-econo
mic goals as 
fairness, just rewards and integrity."
70 
Jennings put the point more succinctly when he noted that: 
"After all we do not let Paul rob Peter merely because he may
 be able to put 
the stolen property to a better economic use."
71 
Such a reliance upon moral imperatives with pleadings of un
fairness, theft and dishonesty, 
Manne suggests, is a consequence of frustration at the inabilit
y to find a justifiable basis for 
regulation. 72 However, it is submitted that these general not
ions of fairness and the belief 
that the behaviour is by its very nature dishonest, is a true
 reflection of the law 's long 
standing concern with the enforcement of fiduciary duties, 
the abuse of confidence and 
unjust enrichment.73 
68 
69 
70 
7 I 
72 
73 
Made pursuant to s.8( I )(c) of the Securities Amendment A
ct 1988. See, below n.284. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss.10, 12(2) and 14. 
See, below n.284. 
R. Schotland, above n.36, 1439. 
R.W. Jennings, "Book Review (Manne (1966))," 55 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1229, 1234 ( 1967). 
H.G. Manne ( 1970) above n.36, 548. Professor Loss note
s that such a criticism of the moral or 
public opinion factor, which relegates it to a proposition
 of "it's just not right." is a grievous 
defect of strictly economic arguments against insider tradin
g. He observes that: "[t]his overlooks 
the fact that it is important for the markets, as it is for the
 courts, not merely to do equity but to 
appear to do equity. Why should the public enter the ma
rkets if the rules of the game make it 
perfectly legitimate for insiders (and their friends and bus
iness associates) to play with marked 
cards?". See L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securiries Regula
rion (Little Brown & Co. Ltd. Boston, 
1983) supp. 1986, 608. 
See, K. Scott. above n.36, 807. 
17 
Entrepreneurial Compensation 
In the face of profiting by insiders in positions of trust
 and confidence, the opponents of 
regulation would argue that profiting by such individual
s should still be permitted because 
it is, in their view, an effective and valuable method of r
ewarding entrepreneurial skills, as 
ordinary methods of compensation are inflexible, 
insufficiently wide ranging ancf 
inacfequate.74 Indeed Carlton & Fischel go so far as to s
ay that the unique advantage of 
insider trading is that it may present a solution to the dile
mma of contract negotiation costs, 
for it allows a company officer to alter their compens
ation package in the light of new 
knowledge, thereby avoiding the costs to the company o
f continual renegotiation.
75 
This view of insider trading as an efficient compensatio
n scheme has been criticised on a 
number of grounds.76 First, it is in fact a very
 inefficient way to compensate 
entrepreneurial talent as it depends to some extent on fo
rtuitous occurrences which enable 
insider trading to be carried out successfully (e.g., a
 takeover bid which has actually 
materialised). The haphazard nature of the reward me
ans that it may not equate with the 
insiders' contribution to the company but rather, the fa
ct that they are able to access such 
price sensitive information, the extent of their financial 
resources and the number of shares 
those resources will enable them to deal in.
77 Moreover, it is difficult to see why 
entrepreneurial talent which has already been brough
t and paid for by the corporation 
should be entitled to additional payments.
78 Furthermore, insider trading creates perverse 
incentives by encouraging company officers to invest in
 risky projects which are likely to 
have the greatest impact on share prices if successful while
 protecting them from the losses 
which such investments may also create by letting the
m insider trade on bad as well as 
good news, before it is released to the market.
79 
This discussion of the theoretical assertions relating to 
insider trading serves to highlight 
the apparent tension between considerations of efficien
cy within the market and equitable 
concerns relating to ethical standards and the perceived r
elationship between insider trading 
and public confidence in the securities markets. The deb
ate rages on with no clear winners 
on either side. Such uncertainty as to whether or not in
sider trading should be constrained 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
H.G. Manne (1966), above n.35. 131-158. 
D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel, above n.36. 87 l. 
D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel, above n.36. 862 and 868. 
See also. H.G. Manne (1966), above 
n.35, 147-"1~8. 
See, M. Mendelson, above n.36. 481-487; K. Scott. above
 n.36, 808. 
See, J. Hetherington, above n.36, 727-730. 
See. R. Schotland, above n.36. 1543. 
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or prohibited is in turn reflected by the sluggish resp
onse of New Zealand's legislature to 
regulate such practices in the recent past. 80 
80 
J 
It should be observed that proposals for the reporti
ng of substantial shareholdings and interests in 
shares of listed companies within New Zealand w
hich were detailed in, Securities Commission, 
"Nominee Shareholdings in Public Companies" (W
ellington, I 982), were never implemented by 
the New Zealand Government. 
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PART III 
3. COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR INSIDE
R TRADING 
( 1) FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND INSIDER TRAD
ING 
The so-called fiduciary duties imposed upon agents of 
the company refers to the body of 
duties invented and elaborated by the Court of Chancer
y in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to ensure that persons holding assets or exerc
ising functions in a representative 
capacity for the benefit of other persons (i.e. the 'bene
ficiary'),will act in good faith to 
protect the interests of those they represent. The dutie
s of good faith and loyalty which 
this fiduciary relationship imposes are virtually identic
al with those of trustees, and to a 
" 
limited extent the description of a fiduciary as a 'trust
ee' still has validity.81 It is now 
generally agreed that the word 'fiduciary' does not o
f itself identify a single class of 
relationships, nor can fiduciary duties be reduced to a
 single set of rules and principles 
which apply to all such relationships. 
82 Therefore, before considering liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty we must first determine whether differ
ent types of insider traders would 
be regarded as fiduciaries and to whom they are fiduciari
es. Secondly, it will be necessary 
to consider the particular duty or duties relevant to imp
osing liability for insider trading, 
which would apply to them. 
.... 
(a) INSIDERS AS FIDUCIARIES DF THE COMPANY 
There is a well established principle of equity that a dir
ector is in a fiduciary relationship 
(i.e., a relationship of trust83 ) with the company. 
84 It is equally clear that company 
officers, at least senior officers occupying positions o
f responsibility,85 owe the same 
duties to the company as directors. Also in a fiduciary 
relationship vis-a-vis the company 
81 
82 
83 
85 
L.C.B. Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company 
Law (4 ed .. Stevens Ltd. London, 1979) 
572. See also, J. Farrar & M. Russell, Company Law a11d
 Securities Regulatio11 in New Zealand, 
above n.22, 224, where it is observed that the director
's position has been said to be analagous to 
that of a trustee. However, this description has sev
ere limitations. The chief of these is the 
different role played by trustees vis-a-vis the taking o
f risks. The law of trusts does not grant a 
wide discretion to trustees, as their normal function is 
to preserve the trust capital at all costs. By 
contrast, directors as fiducaries necessarily take risks. a
nd the Courts have always been reluctant to 
interfere with their business judgement. 
See, P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book Co., Sy
dney,1977) 2. 
See, Great Eastern Railway Co v Turner (1882) LR Ch
 149, Lord Selborne at 152; Sela11gor 
United Rubber Estales Lld v Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 2 All
 ER 1073, 1091-1094. 
See J. Farrar & M. Russell, Company Law and Securities
 Regulation in New Zealand, above 
n.22, 224. 
See, Canadian Aero Services Ltd v O'Malley [1974] 4
0 DLR (3d), Laskin J. at 381; L.C.B. 
Gower, Gower · s Pri11ciples of Modern Company Law ,
 above n.8 I. 574: P.D. Finn, Fiduciary 
Obli}?ations , above n.82, 20 I. 
20 
{ 
would be those professional advisers, such as ba
nkers, brokers and lawyers, who 
undertake to act for or on behalf of the company in 
some particular matter or matters. 
86 
These three categories, (directors, officers and profes
sional advisers), are relatively clear 
cut, but beyond that the position is somewhat blu
rred. Whether employees of the 
company would be regarded as fiduciaries for these p
urposes is debatable and will depend 
on th~ facts of the c~se
87, always bearing in miq/'that the categories of fiducia
ries are not 
closed.88 ' In any event, company employees will o
we a general duty of good faith or 
fidelity which may be sufficiently wide to impose liabi
lity for insider trading.89 
It is unlikely that parties in a business relationship 
with the company, such as a major 
supplier or creditor would be regarded as being in
 a fiduciary relationship with the 
compant,90 even though that relationship may offer o
pportunities to acquire unpublished 
price-serlisitive information about the company. It 
also seems that no fiduciary duties 
would be owed to the company by the employees of 
its professional adviser~.
91 Thus, it 
is clear that not all of the parties who may indulge in i
nsider trading will be held to account 
as fiduciaries to the company, in whose shares they ha
ve traded.92 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
9 I 
92 
See, P. D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, bove n.82, 
201.; LS Sealy, "Fiduciary Relationships" 
(1962) CU 69, 76; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1
942] I All ER 378; English v Dedham Vale 
Properties Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 382. 
The decision of Reading v A-G (1951) AC 507, seems
 to suggests that courts may find employees 
in such a fiduciary relationship if they wish; see R. Goff 
& G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (3 
ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1986) 633. An exa
mple of an American court finding a 
company employee liable for insider trading at com
mon law on a fiduciary basis is Brophy v 
Cities Service Co . 70 A (2d) 5 (1949). 
See, Tate v Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 44; New 
Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys [1973] 
2 NZLR 163; Boston Deep Sea Fishing v Ansell (1888
) 39 Ch D339. 
See, P.D. Finn, above n.82, 266; Faccenda Chicken L
td v Fowler [1986] l All ER 617; Wessex 
Dairies Ltd v Smith [1935] 2 KB 80. In practice th'e 
company employee's obligations regarding 
the use of confidential information is probably the mos
t appropriate basis for liability. 
The courts' reluctance to treat this category of "insid
ers" as fiduciaries stems from the fact that 
parties in such business relationships are acting in th
eir own interests, and not on behalf of the 
company. See, L. Lehane, "Fiduciaries in a Commer
cial Context"; in P.D. Finn (ed), Essays in 
Equity (Law Book Co Ltd, Syd~\.._ 1985) 95; R. Goff
 & G. Jones, supra n.87, 633. 
Although, P.D. Finn, above n.82,vgues at 203 tha
t this is not to say that it would not be 
possible to create fiduciary relationships in that situat
ion. where the employee is to substantially 
perform their employer's undertaking and is aware tha
t what they are doing is for the company's 
benefit. This limitation on the scope of fiduciary duties
 is illustrated by the famous American case 
US v Chiarella 445 US 222 (1980), where an employ
ee of a printing firm had decoded takeover 
documents which his employer was printing on behalf
 of a company. Having identified the target 
companies from the documents the employee purchase
d shares in these companies ahead of public 
announcements of the takeover bids. The United Sta
tes Supreme Court held that the employee 
was not in a fiduciary relationship with the target com
panies in whose shares he dealt. as he was 
not an insider of these companies. Neither was he in 
a fiduciary relationship with the victims he 
had purchased shares from as he had no prior dealings w
ith them. he was not their agent nor was he 
a person in whom they had placed their trust and confid
ence. However it must be pointed out that 
the court did not consider whether the defendant had 
broken any duty to his employer or to the 
company which engaged his employer. for the issue ha
d not been put to the jury. 
This is not to suggest that those not covered will escap
e liability under common law. for they may 
well be subject to other constraints such as breach of co
nfidence. 
21 
Profit Making By Fiduciaries 
"I can resist anything but temptation" said Oscar Wilde.
93 Most human beings seem 
equally equipped to face the world. Those persons who are in
 a fiduciary relationship with 
a company are likely to be presented with more temptations th
an most, for their relationship 
with a company may give them access to valuable economic
 information and, while they 
are required to serve the company's interests, they will often 
encounter clear opportunities 
to enrich themselves. However, one of the most important d
uties a fiduciary owes to the 
company is that they will not place themselves in a posit
ion where their duty to the 
company and their own interests conflict or may conflict.
94 Thus, fiduciaries are required 
to put the interests of the company before their own.9
5 In the context of insider trading, a 
fiduciary who pursues their own interests by purchasing or s
elling shares in the company 
would not appear to be in conflict with the interests of the com
pany , as companies in New 
Zealand are unable to purchase their own shares.
96 However , notwithstanding this 
logical difficulty, "the building blocks are at hand"
97 as one particular aspect of the conflict 
of interest' duty which is of greatest relevance in the insider 
trading context is the rule of 
equity that a person who is in a fiduciary relationship with th
e company is not entitled to 
profit from that position. 98 This "no-profit" rule has bee
n ·rigorously applied by the 
courts, as illustrated by the leading decisions of Regal (H
astings) Ltd v Gulliver 99 , 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Lady Windermere' s Fan, Act I; see, H.M. Hyde (ed), Osca
r Wilde , The Complete Plays (Methuen 
Ltd, London, 1988) 38. 
Aberdeen Railway Co Ltd v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq
 642, 471-472; Bray v Ford (1896) AC 
44, 51; Boulting v ACTA [1963] 1 All ER 716, 728; New
 Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys 
[1973] 1 WLR 1126.1129. 
See, Bray v Ford (1896) AC 44, per Lord Herschell at 51-5
2; "It is an inflexible rule of a Court of 
Equity that a person in a fiduciary position ... is not allow
ed to put himself in a position where 
his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me tha
t this rule is. as has been said, founded 
upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on
 the consideration that, human nature 
being what it is, there is danger in such circumstances, of 
the person holding a fiduciary position 
being swayed by interest, rather than by duty, and thus pre
judicing those whom he was bound to 
protect." 
See, Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409. 
L. Loss, "The Fiduciary Concept as applied to Corporate 'In
siders· in the United States .. (1970) 33 
MLR 34. 34. 
See, Bray v Ford ( 1896) AC 44, Lord Herschell at 51; Re
gal ( Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [ 1942] 1 
All ER 378; New Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys [19
73] 2 NZLR 163. Lord Wilberforce at 
166. 
[ 1942] I All ER 378. The directors of Regal (Hastings) L
td (hereinafter to be referred to as the 
company) wished to extend the company's operation by the
 acquisition of two cinemas in addition 
to those already owned. Thereby, a subsidiary company 
was set up with_the share capital in it 
being subscribed for by Regal itself. four of its directors. th
e company'ssolicitor and certain third 
parties introduced by the company chairman. These individ
ual shareholders agreed to subscribe for 
the shares after Regal was unable to raise more than £2,000
 of the £5.000 share capital required for 
the subsidiary. Eventually the business was taken over by
 means of a sale of the shares in Regal 
and the subsidiary. The net result was -that the sharehold
ers in the subsidiary made a profit of 
almost £3 per share on their holdings. The new owners of
 Regal promptly sued to recover these 
22 
Boardman v Phipps lOO and Industrial Development Consult
ants Ltd v Cooley . lOl In 
particular, it is seen to be irrelevant that profits sought by the 
fiduciary could not have been 
obtained by the company. The fiduciary will be held stric
tly liable to account for any 
profits gained by virtue of their relationship with the company
.102 
It seems clear that fiduciaries would therefore be liable to 
account to the company for 
personal profits gained from share purchases, where their
 position as a fiduciary has 
enabled them to exploit unpublished price sensitive informati
on. 103 However, the p..9sition 
is not so clear when a fiduciary has used such informat
ion in selling their existing 
shareholdings, thereby avoiding a loss on the release of so
me adverse news. At first 
glance this situation does not appear to fall foul of the no-pro
fit rule as there is not a profit 
in the usual sense of the word. 
104 However, since the essence of the no-profit rule is to 
prevent a fiduciary making gains from their position within
 the company, it is arguable, 
therefore, that the concept of a profit should be interpreted in
 a wide sense so as to include 
the use of a fiduciary position to avoid a loss that would other
wise be suffered. 
It may be argued that the policy which underlies the 'conflic
t of interest' duty from which 
the ' no-profit rule' is derived, is the deterrence of possib
le prejudice or injury to the 
company. 105 As previously noted 
106 it is difficult to identify any particular loss or injury 
107 suffered by the company as a result of insider trading, exce
pt in those cases where a 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
profits. The House of Lords found that the directors had obt
ained their profits by reason and in the 
course of the execution of their office. The directors were t
hus liable to account to the company. 
It appeared to make no difference that the directors had ac
ted bonafide throughout, and that the 
company could not have exploited the opportunity to acquir
e the shares of its intended subsidiary 
since it did not have the necessary cash assets. 
[ 1967) 2 AC 46 oli€itor who acted for a family trust a
nd one of the beneficiaries had used 
confidential infonnation about a company, wfiich they had ob
tained while representing the interests 
of the trust, to purchase shares in the company at an und
ervalue and subsequently recovered 
substantial profits on the~ They were held liable to accou
nt to the family trust despite the fact 
that they had acted honestly throughout, that the trust ha
d not been harmed but had actually 
benefitted from the transactions in question, and that the t
rust could not itself have brought the 
shares. 
[1972) 2 All ER 162. In this case a managing director h
ad privately entered into a business 
contract, which he gained knowledge of by virtue of his posi
tion as a director. The court held that 
the director was liable to account to the company for the 
benefits derived under this contract, 
despite the fact that the company itself could not have gained
 the contract in question. 
Supra n.100 and n.102. 
It might also be noted that directors cannot escape liability
 to account to the company for such 
profits, by means of resignation from the board either bef
ore or after the profit is made. See, 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [ 1972) 2 A
ll ER 162. 
See, P.O. Finn. above n.82. at 127 for a discussion on t
he question of imposing liability in 
respect of savings made rather than profits gained. 
See, Bray v Ford ( 1896) AC 44, per Lord Herschell 51-52. 
See, above n.37. 
One possible source of corporate injury was identified in D
iamond v Oreamuno 248 NE 2d 910 
( l 969) where Chief Judge Fuld observed at 912 that: "despit
e the lack of any specific allegation of 
damage, it may well be inferred that the defendants· actions
 might have caused some harm to the 
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fiduciary has diverted a 'corporate opportunity' for themselv
es. 108 Thus, the use of such 
a fiduciary duty to constrain the practice of insider trading in 
the absence of any particular 
injury to the company arguably results in a distortion of th
e fundamental policy which 
underlies this duty. 
Ratification 
It is clear that the company in a general meeting of sha
reholders, at least if it acts 
unanimously, can waive a fiduciary's liability to account f
or a breach of the 'no-profit 
rule'. 109 However, where they purport to ratify such a brea
ch by a simple majority in a 
general meeting, the answer is less clear cut. In the Regal de
cision 110, the House of Lords 
assumed, without much discussion, that the directors as co
ntrolling shareholders could 
have protected themselves against any liability to account h
ad they obtained the prior or 
subsequent approval of the general meeting 
111 . There is some difficulty however, in 
reconciling this view with the decision in Cook v Deeks 
112, where it was held by the Privy 
Council that fiduciaries could not make a present of corpor
ate assets for themselves, by 
exercising their voting control of the general meeting to ratif
y a diversion of profits away 
from the company and into their own pockets.
113 
These two cases are usually distinguished on the basis th
at Regal would permit the 
ratification of bonafide, incidental, profit making as opposed 
to the malafide expropriation 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
11 3 
enterprise. Although the corporation may have little conce
rn with the day-lo-day transactions in 
its shares, it has a great interest in maintaining a reputation
 of integrity, an image of probity. for 
its management and insuring the continued public acceptanc
e and marketability of its stock. When 
officers and directors abuse their position in order to gain pe
rsonal profits, the effect may be to cast 
a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder relatio
ns and undermine public regard for the 
corporation's securities." 
See, J. Farrar & M. Russell, Company Law and Securities Regula
tion in New Zealand. above 
n.22, 247; see also. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 
1 All ER 378; Cook v Deeks [1916] I 
AC 554; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley 
[ 1972] 2 All ER 162. 
New Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys [1973] 2 NZLR
 163; J. Farrar & M. Russell. above 
n.22, 249. 
[ I 942] I All ER 378, Lord Russell at 389. 
Permitting such ratification would tie in with the view supp
orted by Carlton & Fischel. who argue 
that insider trading is purely an internal matter to be regulat
ed contractually between the directors 
and the shareholders. See, D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fische
l, "The Regulation of Insider 
Trading,"above n.36. 857. 
[1916] I AC 554. In this case three out of four directors of
 a railway company diverted a contract 
in which the company was interested to another company
 owned by the directors. These three 
directors used their voting control of the general meeting
 to secure the passing of a resolution 
declaring that the company had no interest in the contract.
 The Privy Council refused to permit 
the general meeting to ratify such conduct, finding that the c
ontract in question was entered into in 
such circumstances that it belonged in equity to the compan
y and ought to have been dealt with as 
an asset of the company. The directors had acquired it for t
hemselves while acting obstensibly for 
the company, therefore, they held the contract on trust for th
e company. Thus, the directors could 
not retain the benefit of the contract. 
[1916] 1 AC 554, Lord Buckmaster L.C. at 564. 
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of corporate assets which Cook v Deeks represents.
114 If that is the true distinction, into 
which category would insider trading fall? It is submitted that insider tradin
g by a 
fiduciary is unlikely to be regarded as a Regal type bonafide incidental, profit m
aking 
situation. It is more likely, in light of present day attitudes to such conduct,
115 to be 
regarded as a misappropriation of company assets (in the form of unreleased price-se
nsitive 
information) as in Cook v Deeks 116 . Thus, such conduct may not be ratifiabl
e by a 
simple majority in a general meeting, for the "majority cannot directly or ind
irectly 
appropriate to themselves money, property or advantages which belong to the comp
any, or 
in which the other shareholders are entitled to participate."
117 Such a breach could 
therefore only be ratified by the company in a general meeting if a majority of sharehold
ers 
who are independent of the wrongdoing fiduciary voted to waive that fiduciary's liab
ility to 
account. 118 
However, if the matter is found to be capable of ratification by a simple majority as
 in the 
Regal decision, then a wrongdoing fiduciary can vote as a shareholder to ratify the
ir own 
misconduct. 119 Unless expressly stated in articles of the company ratification
 is not 
required to be carried out by a disinterested majority independent of the wron
gdoing 
fiduciary. It is submitted that such a requirement would be undesirable as the re
sulting 
resolution would only reflect the interests of disinterested shareholders. Such a p
rocess 
would obscure the proper focus of enquiry, which is the interests of the compan
y as a 
general body. 120 In any event, the interests of disinterested shareholders m
ay be 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
See, L.S. Sealy, above n.86 , 262. See also, L.C.B. Gower, above n.81 , who n
otes at 617 that 
providing a satisfactory answer to the distinction between these two cases is diffi
cult and perhaps 
impossible. One distinguishing feature which might be noted is that in Co
ok v D eeks the 
majority in general meeting was comprised of the very individuals who had diverte
d the contract to 
themselves whereas in Regal there is some suggestion that Lord Russell had in m
ind ratification 
by a majority in general meeting which was independent of the wrongdoers. 
An independent 
ratification requirement however must be doubted, for company law has never requ
ired wrongdoing 
directors to abstain from exercising their votes as shareholders to ratify their breac
hes of duty , see 
Northwestern Transportion Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589; Burland v E
arle [1902] AC 
83, Lord Davey at 94. 
The evidence supporting this claim as to present day attitudes in New Zealand tow
ards the conduct 
of insider trading is, perhaps unavoidably. largely anecdotal. 
This approach requires that infonnation be accepted as property in the sense of b
eing a corporate 
asset. There is some support for this view in Boardman v Phipps [ 1967] 2 AC 
46. where Lord 
Cohen at 103 , while accepting infonnation was not property in the strictest sense o
f the word. still 
regarded it as an asset of the trust which trustees could not appropriate for themse
lves. Both Lord 
Hodson at 103 and Lord Guest at 115, accepted that confidential information could
 be regarded as 
the property of the trust. However, Lord Upjohn at 127 was unwilling to accept 
that information 
could be treated as property. See, R. Goff & G. Jones, above n.87. 653. 
Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, Lord Davey at 93; Esrmanco (Kiln er House) Ltd v
 GLC [1982] l 
All ER 437. 
Above n. l 14. 
Norrh Western Transporwrion Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589: Burland
 v Earle (1902) 
AC 83, Lord Davey at 94. See also, J . Farrar & M. Russell. above n.22, 264. 
See. Law Commission. "Report No.9. Company Law Reform and Restateme
nt"(Wellington, 
1989), para 535. 
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adequately protected by s.209 of the Companies Act 1955
121 , as the exercise of defacto 
voting control over a general meeting by interested sharehol
ders so as to ratify their own 
wrongdoing, could amount to 'unfairly prejudicial' conduct.
122 
Liability to the Company 
It must be emphasised that the fiduciary relationship here is be
t~een the company whose 
unpublished price sensitive information is used or disclosed 
and the individual fiduciary. 
Therefore, where the profit making by fiduciaries is not ratif
iable ( or if while ratifiable, it 
has not yet been ratified), then an action for breach of fiduciar
y duty would lie in the hands 
of the company, and not with any individual victim of
 the insider trading (i.e., a 
shareholder123). As to the nature of the liability imposed, 
the basic position is that any 
fiduciary who profits from their position of trust will hold th
at profit on constructive trust 
for the company. 124 
The Rule in Foss v Harbottle ·
125 
If the company decides not to initiate proceedings against a fid
uciary who has received a 
profit by means of insider trading, the question arises as to w
hether a derivative action on 
behalf of the company for brnllch of duty would be available 
to a shareholder invoking the 
"fraud on the minority" exception to th6rule in Foss v Harb
ottle. 126 It is submitted that 
such a breach of duty would satisfy the initial requirement of 
this exception that, the action 
sought to be brought is one that cannot be ratified by a simple
 majority of the company in a 
general meeting, 127 for reasons previously stated .
128 The shareholder is also required to 
show that the wrongdoers are in control of the company and
 are thus preventing such an 
action being brought. This may be problematic, as the comp
any's decision not to proceed 
against a fiduciary who has profited from their position of trus
t by means of insider trading 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
See, J. Farrar & M. Russell , above n.22, 264. 
Cook v Deeks 1916] J AC 554, per Lord Buckmaster L. C. at 564-565: " Even suppos
ing it be not 
ultra vires of a company to make a present to its director
s , it appears quite certain that directors 
holding a majority of votes would not be permitted to ma
ke a present to themselves. This would 
be to allow a majority to oppress the minority ... " 
The issue of whether an insider trader may owe fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders of a company 
will be considered further below. See, below n.132. 
See, R. Goff & G. Jones, above n.87, 656. 
(1843) 2 Hare 461. 
( 1843) 2 Hare 461. See, J. Farrar & M. Russell, above n.22. 262.
 
If the breach is capable of being ratified, then a derivati
ve action will not lie. since there is no 
objection to fiduciary's using their votes to exculpate t
hemselves in such circumstances; see, 
Northwestern Transportation Co. Ltd v. Beatty ( 1887) 12 A
pp Cas 589. However, ratifying one's 
own wrongdoing may amount to unfairly prejudicial cond
uct within s. 209 of the Companies Act 
1955; see, J. Farrar & M. Russell, above n.22, 264. 
Above n.118 . 
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may not always be a reflection of the wrongdoers ability
 to control the general meeting but, 
rather, a decision by the company that such proceeding
s would result in adverse publicity 
for the company, which would damage its standing 
in the financial market's and thus 
would not be in the best interests of the company. 
Even if a derivative action could be brought, individual sha
reholders have little incentive to 
pursue such a course, particularly in light of the fact th
at any benefit gained would be held 
on behalf of the company and would not advantage the
 individual shareholder. 12
9 Indeed, 
to the exten't that the fiduciary engaging in insider trad
ing is also a shareholder, then some 
of the retrieved profit would actually find its way back
 to them. 130 The incentive to bring 
a "derivative action" against the fiduciary who is in
 breach would be greatest for any 
shareholder who has sold some
131 of their shares at the same time as the fiduciary 
purchased shares in the market; but even such a share
holder as this is unlikely to favour 
such an action which retrieves what they perceive to
 be their loss and delivers it to the 
company. 
{ b) DIRECTORS AS FIDUCIARIES OF THE
 SHAREHOLDERS 
This brings us to the question of whether a shareholdin
g victim of a director132 engaging in 
insider trading has any cause of action against such a1
:iirector. Does a director owe any 
fiduciary duties to shareholders? 
The orthodox approach is that set out in Percival v iy'
right 133 , such that directors do·not 
owe any fiduciary duties to individual shareholders. 
This case therefore represents a 
major obstacle to any attempt by shareholders to seek
 civil remedies against directors.
134 
However, it has long been accepted that there may be
 limited circumstances or "special 
129 
130 
l 3 1 
132 
133 
134 
The plaintiffs would therefore only benefit indirectly; i
.e .. through the fact of their shareholding in 
the company. 
How much they would retrieve would, of course, depen
d on the size of their shareholding. 
If they have sold thejr entire shareholding they wou!.9 lac
k locus srandi to bring such a derivative 
action. 
It is submitted that there is little likelihood of any fiduciar
y relationship being established between 
shareholders and such insiders as company officers o
r professional advisers who may not be in 
sufficient proximity to the shareholders to give rise to a
 fiduciary relationship. 
[1902] 2 Ch 421. This case involved an action to set a
side a sale of shares in a limited company, 
on the ground that the purchasers. being directors
, ought to have disclosed to the vendor 
shareholders certain pending negotiations for the sale
 of the company's undertaking. The court 
found, on the facts, that the directors did not owe any
 duty of disclosure to the shareholders ,md 
could purchase their shares without disclosing the fact 
of the negotiations. Swinfen Eady J. stated 
at 426 that the contrary view would place directors in a
 most invidious position. as they could not 
buy or sell shares without disclosing negotiations, a pr
emature disclosure of which might well be 
against the interests of the company. 
The Percival v Wright approach has recently been fo
llowed by the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia in Divine Holdings Pty Ltd v Paracel Pry Ltd
 [ 1980] 4 ACLR 928. 
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facts", 135 which could result in the creation of an independent fiduciary relationship 
between a director and an individual shareholder. This occurred in Allen v Hyatt 
136 , 
where directors of the company put themselves in a fiduciary relationship with some of the 
shareholders when they undertook to sell those individuals' shares in an agency capacity. 
Even without such a specific appointment directors may, in particular circumstances, find 
themselves within a special relationship with the shareholders which requires disclosure of 
all material facts, as was accepted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the influential 
case of Coleman v Myers .137 The special facts in this case which caused the directors to 
owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure to shareholders138 were found to be:
139 
" ... the family character of the company; the position of the father and son 
in the company and the family; their high degree of inside knowledge; and 
the way they went about the takeover and the persuasion of the 
shareholders". 
The courts have also been prepared to regard the context of a takeover as providing the 
necessary "special circumstances" for fixing fiduciary duties upon directors towards 
individual shareholders. For example, in Gething v Kilner 140 Brightman J considered 
that where a take-over bid had been made, the directors of the offeree company were under 
a duty to their own shareholders to be honest and not to mislead such shareholders into 
accepting an inadequate price for their holdings. Thus, directors of an offeree company 
who purchase shares from existing shareholders while in possession of such price-
sensitive information concerning a take-over bid may well owe a fiduciary duty to disclose 
such material information to the vendor shareholders. 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
This concept is somewhat akin to the "special facts doctrine" accepted long ago in the United 
States as the common law forerunner to their extensive statutory scheme for insider trading. The 
"special facts doctrine" as expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Strong v Repide 213 
US 419 ( 1909) extended the duties of directors to imply a fiduciary obligation towards shareholders 
where special facts existed (i.e., where a director purchased shares from a shareholder without 
infonning them of an impending sale of the company's assets which would affect the value of the 
shares). 
[1914] 30 TLR 444. 
[ 1977) 2 NZLR 225. This case involved the take-over at an undervalue of a family company by a 
company formed by one of the respondent directors of the family company. The respondents held 
the positions of chairman and managing director of the family company. Essentially it was alleged 
that the respondents had obtained control of the family company by buying out the other 
shareholders from whom the true value of the company's assets had been concealed. 
The directors were held to owe a fiduciary duty to these shareholders to disclose material matters, as 
to which they knew or had reason to believe that these shareholders would not be adequately 
infonned of. 
[1977) 2 NZLR 225. per Cooke J. at 330. 
[1972) l All ER 1166. 
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From these cases it is clear that the courts will not automatically impose a fiduciary duty of 
disclosure upon directors when they enter into transactions with the company's 
shareholders. However, the courts will consider imposing such a duty where there are 
face-to-face negotiations between the parties which gives rise to a relationship between the 
parties in which the shareholder obviously relies on the director to disclose all material 
information. 141 This will undoubtedly be of considerable significance in closely held 
private companies where there is likely to be face-to-face share dealings between a director 
and a shareholder. However, such a duty may be unsuitable in the context of a publicly 
listed company where most of the trading will occur on an impersonal level through the 
stock exchange, 142 where neither the shareholder or the director can identify the person on 
the 'other side' of the transaction. Indeed, as Langevoort points out,
143 neither party 
knows nor cares who their buyers or sellers are, there is no bargaining similar to that in 
face-to-face transactions, and furthermore, given the essential independence of the buyer 
and seller's decisions to deal, causation and injury are difficult to trace. Thus, such a duty 
is unlikely to have any impact in the context of stock exchange dealings where none of the 
special circumstances 144 relied upon in Coleman v Myers are likely to be present. Mr 
Justice Mahon expressly recognised this obstacle in the Coleman case and concluded that in 
the context of transactions conducted anonymously through the stock exchange the 
regulation of directors liability to shareholders for insider trading must be left to the 
legislature. 145 
141 
142 
143 ) 
144 
145 
C. Patterson, ' 'Insider Trading and the Director," in J. Farrar (ed), Contemporary Issues in 
-w2J!!pany Law (C.C.H. NZ Ltd, Auckland. 1987) 178. 
However, there does not appear to be any reason why the 'special circumstances· approach should 
not apply to share transactions between directors and shareholders of all companies, including those 
listed on the Stock Exchange. when the transaction is preceded by direct communication between 
the parties. There are as yet no New Zealand cases where the Court has applied the fiduciary duty 
in this way; see, C. Patterson, above n.141, 179. See also. Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 
225, Mahon J. at 278. 
D. C. Langevoort. "Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement". 70J 
Calif L.Rev I, 7 ( 19.82). 
Above n.139. 
[ 1977] 2 NZLR 225. per Mahon J. 278: "The application of the rule so assumed to exist must 
necessarily be confined to private companies and to such transactions in public company shares. 
listed or otherwise. where the identity of the shareholder is known to the director at the time of the 
sale ... [I]n the case of stock exchange purchases and sales the regulation of insider trading must be 
left Lo the legislature." As shall be seen this statement was a prophesy of things to come. as Part 
I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 which was introduced to deal with the problem of insider 
trading in New Zeal,md's securities markets, will only apply Lo public issuers of securities listed 
on a stock exchange (i.e. publicly listed companies). See, below n.268. 
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(c) DIRECTORS AS FIDUCIARIES TO PERSONS OUTSIDE THE 
COMPANY 
Given the difficulties outlined above in establishing some fiduciary relationship between a 
director and an existing shareholder, it is submitted that no such liability will exist between 
a director and a party who is not an existing shareholder. The imposition of a fiduciary 
duty depends on a pre-existing relationship between the fiduciary and the principal. Thus, 
a director who engages in insider trading by selling their shareholding in advance of 
disappointing results to a purchaser who isn't an existing shareholder, will not be found 
liable to account to such a purchaser on the basis of any fiduciary relationship. 
Consequently, directors in possession of price-sensitive information may trade with 
persons outside the company with relative impunity. 146 
It is, therefore, anomalous that where a shareholder can establish that a fiduciary duty of 
disclosure is owed to them by directors under the "special facts" approach discussed in the 
previous .:5ection, 147 they will have redress against a director engaging in insider trading, 
but that no relief at all is available where fortuitously the person with whom the directof-' 
deals is a complete outsider. However, in the United States where r. lOb-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 applies, the courts have interpreted that provision as 
imposing upon the insider "[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material facts known to them 
by virtue of their position" 148 to both existing shareholders and complete outsiders. This ---was demonstrated in the Re Cady, Roberts & Co. decision where the SEC refused to limit 
the application of r.1 Ob-5 to existing shareholders noting that such an approach was too 
narrow and ignored the plight of the buying public. 149 
146 
147 
148 
149 
However, such directors may well be subject to other constraints. See, above n.16 and n.17. 
See, above n.135. 
Re Cady, Roberts & Co . 40 SEC 907,911 (1961). 
40 SEC 907, 911-912 (1961). In this case an employee of a brokerage firm was also a director of 
a public company. At a director's meeting of that public company. the employee learned that the 
company was about to announce a reduction in its dividend. The employee/director passed this 
infonnation on to another partner in the brokerage finn. Before this infonnation becrune publicly 
available, the partner sold shares in that public company out of a number of his customers' 
accounts. The SEC held in this case that there had been a breach of r. lOb-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. It stated that corporate insiders have a duty to disclose material facts known 
to them by virtue of their position , and which are not known to the persons they are dealing with, 
and which, if known would affect their investment decision. The SEC also noted at 911 that 
where the disclosure was inappropriate the transaction should be foregone by the insider. 
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(d) TIPPEE LIABILITY TO THE COMPANY AS A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUSTEE 
In general terms an insider who communicates unpublished price-sensitive information to 
any other person has engaged in the act of "tipping," hence the recipient of that inside 
information is denoted by the term "tippee."150 Tipping by insiders is an integral element 
in many insider trading schemes. 151 This raises a question as to whether any civil liability 
can attach to a tippee participating in su~h a scheme which involves a breach of fiduciary 
duty by the insider who discloses price-sensitive information to the tippee, so as to enable 
the tippee to trade on the basis of that inside information. Given that it is difficult, as noted 
above, 152 for anyone other than the company to found any liability on a breach of fiduciary 
' 
duty, we will concentrate here on the possibility of the company recovering any insider 
trading profits made by a tippee. '---
The liability of the tippee will depend on whether third parties who participate in a 
fiduciary's breach of trust may be liable to account to the company as constructive 
trustees. 153 The classic statement of the circumstances in which a constructive trust may 
be imposed upon a "stranger" (i.e., the tippee who is outside the relevant fiduciary -
principal relationship) is to be found in the judgement of Lord Selborne_ in Barnes v 
Addy: l54 
"[S]trangers are not to be made constructive trustees in transactions within 
their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may 
disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some 
part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a 
dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees." 
Lord Selborne's judgement is the source from which subsequent judgements have 
developed two separate categories whereby a constructive trust may be imposed upon a 
third party.155 These two categories are; 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
See, P. Mitchell, Insider Dealing and Direcwrs' Duties (2 ed., Butterworths, London, 1989) 239-
240. 
See, e.g., Re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 SEC 907 ( 1961), as discussed above at n.149. 
Above n.146. 
See, C. Harpum, "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee" (1986) 102 LQR I 14, 118-119 on the 
nature of a third party's liability as a constructive trustee. Generally the third party is required to 
account for any improper gain or to make good any loss suffered as a result of their actions. 
( 1874) 9 LR. Ch.App 224, Lord Se I borne at 251-252. 
Selangor United Rubber Estates ltd v Cradock (No . 3) [1968) 2 All ER 1073: Karak Rubber Co 
Ltd v Burden [1972] 1 All ER 1210; Belmollt Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No. 2) 
[ 1980) I All ER 393; fllt ernational Sales & Agencies ltd v Marcus [ 1982) 3 All ER 551; Lipkill 
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(1) Where the third party has knowingly received trust property, disposed of in breach 
of trust; and 
(2) Where the third party has knowingly assisted in a dishonest and fraudulent design 
of the trustee. 
Thus, the key requirement in order to impose liability under these two categories is 
'knowing' participation by the third party in a breach of trust. However, difficulties have 
arisen over the degree of knowledge which must be established under each category and the 
position has been clouded by the often conflicting formulations in the cases as to the 
appropriate standard to be applied. 156 It is therefore difficult to state the position with 
complete certainty and that caveat must be borne in mind when considering the relevant 
authorities. 
( i) A Tip pee Who Knowingly Receives Trust Property 
The first category, that of third parties who receive company assets disposed of in breach 
of trust, brings us back to the issue discussed earlier; 157 can unpublished price-sensitive 
information be classified as 'corporate property'? Assuming that information can be 
classified as property in this way, tippees who receive unpublished price sensitive 
information would, according to the generally accepted view, be liable as constructive 
trustees to account for any gain made from such information, if they received the property 
with actual knowledge of the fiduciary's breach of trust or in circumstances in which they 
ought to have known of the breach. 158 It would seem that such a degree of knowledge 
could be established where, for example, the tippee is a participant in an insider trading 
scheme, where the individuals concerned act as either a tipper or a tippee, and where all 
such individuals are fully aware that the information is being wrongfully disclosed. 
159 On 
the other hand, it is doubtful if the requisite degree of knowledge could be established 
where the tippee received the information in the course of a casual social conversation; 
156 
157 
158 
159 
Gorman v Karpnale Lid (1987) BCLC 159. See generally, C. Harpum, above n.153; A.J. Oakley. 
Constructive Trusts (2 ed .. Sweet & Maxwell. London, 1987) 85-111: G. Moffatt and M. 
Chestennan, Trust Law: Text and Materials (Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. London, 1988) 606-
607. . 
See, G. Moffatt and M. Chestennan. above n.155. 609-613. 
Above n.114. 
Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No. 2) [1980] I All ER 393; International 
Sales & Agencies Ltd v Marcus [ 1982] 3 All ER 551; Lipkin Gorman :1 Karpnale Ltd (1987) 
BCLC 159. 
It seems safe to assume that insider trading schemes would involve persons who are familiar with 
the workings of the securities market and thus would not be unaware of the nature and sources of 
such price-sensitive infonnation which is being tipped to them. 
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although this would be subject to such factors as the degree of knowledge possessed by the 
tippee of matters such as the insider's position within the company concerned. 
An illustration of the tippee problem is provided by the Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 
decision, 160 discussed above, 161 where the chairman of the company did not purchase any 
of the shares himself and.his involvement was limited to that of finding third parties to 
purchase shares in the subsidiary company. Thus, the chairman was not liable to account 
to the company because he had not profited from his position, and the third party 
purchasers (i.e. tippee's) were not party to the action presumably because, on the facts, 
they did not possess the requisite degree of knowledge to found any liability upon 
constructive trust. As a rule, however, where the insider does not profit himself, the third 
party could still be liable for the knowing receipt of corporate property, if the requisite level 
of knowledge can be established. Indeed, where the insider does not profit but has 
consciously broken their duty to the company by disclosing the information, then it has 
been suggested that the director should be liable to account to the company for the tippee's 
gain. 162 On the other hand where, as in Regal, the insider innocently discloses 
information in breach of trust, which a third party innocently uses, then it is submitted that 
it would be unlikely tbnt liability would be imposed under the doctrine of constructive trust. 
~ This type of innocent disclosure by the fiduciary with no consequential liability for the 
in~ocent tippee was the basis for the well known United States decision, SEC v Dirks.
163 
... 
In this case the defendant, Dirks, was a financial analyst who received information from a 
former officer (Secrist) of a company (Equity Funding of America) that the assets of that 
company were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent corporate practices. Secrist 
disclosed this information to Dirks because he wanted Dirks to investigate the fraud and 
disclose it publicly. In the course of carrying out his investigation Dirks discussed the 
information he obtained with his own clients, some of whom promptly sold their holdings 
in Equity Funding. In due course the authorities investigated Equity Funding and found 
the allegations to be true, and the company subsequently went into receivership. 
Obviously Dirks' clients had avoided a substantial loss by acting on the information 
"tipped" to them by Dirks. The SEC164 took the view that Dirks, as a tippee, had been 
subject to a "disclose or abstain" obligation as a consequence of his being tipped by the 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
[ 1942] I All ER 378. 
See. above n.99. 
See. R. Goff & G. Jones. The Law of Resitution , above n.87. 653 who suggests that the insider 
should be liable for the gains which they have enabled the third party to make by their breach of 
fiduciary duty. This has happened in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co 40 I F 2d 833 (1968) where 
the non-trading insiders were liable for their tippees gains under Rule IOb-5 (which was 
promulgated under§. IOb of the Securities Exchange Act 1934). 
103 S.Ct 3255; 77 L. Ed., 2d 913 (1983). 
The Securities & Exchange Commission. 
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insider (Secrist) and duly prosecuted him for his conduct. The Supreme court disagreed, 
as they applied the now standard fiduciary-type approach set out in US v Chiarella,
165 that 
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties to the transaction, and accepted that he had not been under 
• 
any duty to "disclose or abstain." _; A tippee 's duty to disclose or abstain arose when there 
had been a breach of dutY-.!2y the insider and the tippee knew or ought to have known of it. 
Therefore, whether the insider's tip constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty is 
the first issue which must be decided, for not all disclosures of unpublished price sensitive 
information are inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders.
166. In the 
jircumstances of this case there had been no breach by Secrist; he had not passed on the 
information to benefit personally, directly or indirectly .
167 He received no monetary 
benefit nor did he do it to make a gift of the information to Dirks. Instead he was clearly 
motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. As there was no breach by Secrist, Dirks could 
not be a participant in any breach of fiduciary duty by such an insider.
168 
It is obvious that imposing liability on the tippee's tippee, who may be referred to as the 
'sub-tippee', is even more difficult. A sub-tippee may be quite unaware of the original 
source of the information, and may even possess certain doubts as to its accuracy, thus in 
practice it may be very difficult to establish that a sub-tippee necessarily knew that such 
information has been given in breach of duty. It is unlikely therefore that civil liability on 
... 
this basis, can extend in practice to the sub-tippee. 
(ii) A Tippee Who Has Knowingly Assisted in the Dishonest and 
Fraudulent Design of the Trustee 
The second category to be considered is that which allows liability to be imposed on the 
basis of knowing assistance by third parties in the dishonest and fraudulent design of the 
insider. 169 Here too, there is considerable doubt over the degree of knowing involvement 
which is required, with the generally accepted view being that liability will arise where the 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
445 us 222 (1980). 
A legitimate disclosure would, for example, cover disclosure in the ordinary course of busi
ness 
(i.e., disclosure of information to professional advisers). If such a disclosure is legitimate then
 the 
person receiving it (tippee) is not receiving it in breach of ,my trust. 
See, 77 L. Ed. 2d 913, 927-928 (1983). 
See, 77 L. Ed, 2d 913. 927-928 (1983). 
The liability here will be a personal liability to account as no trust property will have 
been 
received; see. H. Hanbury & R. Maudsley. Modem Equity (13 ed .. Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. 
1989) 289: J. Nathan & 0. Marshall. Cases and Commentary on the Law of Trusts (7 ed .. 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. 1980) 413. 
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third parties actually knew of the breach of duty or wilfully shut their eyes to it.
170 This 
category, which is not dependent upon the receipt of property, is useful because it avoids 
the difficulties already encountered in treating information as property. However, it poses 
hurdles of its own in terms of the degree of knowledge required and the degree of 
• 
wrongdoing required of the fiduciary. It is necessary, for example, to establish that the 
assistance was assistance in a dishonest and fraudulent design which, in this context, 
requires something more than mere misfeasance or breach of trust.
171 It must be 
fraudulent and dishonest in the plain understanding of those words.
172. It is submitted 
that in practice it is unlikely to prove difficult to establish such a dishonest and fraudulent 
design in most insider trading scenarios, although Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver
173 is an 
example of when it could not be established, for the court in this case found that the 
directors had acted bona fide throughout the disputed dealings. 
As to the degree of assistance by a third party that is required, this will be of interest to 
individuals such as bankers and stockbrokers who often play an important role in any 
insider trading scheme by virtue of the services they supply within the securities market. 
Would a stockbroker who executed transactions for an insider trader be liable, where they 
are aware of the client's position of trust at the time of the trading and where they have 
subsequently become aware of the coincidence of such trading ahead of the release of price 
sensitive information? It is submitted that the answer is surely that they would not be 
liable, for they have simply facilitated an ordinary commercial transaction and had no 
grounds at that point in time for thinking that there was anything untoward. However, 
would the position be different if the same scenario had occurred on a number of 
occasions? What if the stockbroker continued to execute such transactions, because it was 
170 
171 
172 
173 
See, Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No . 1) [1979) All ER
 118, 
where all the judges in the English Court of Appeal disagreed with the view supported by Sela
ngor 
United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No. 3) [1968) 2 All ER 1973, and Karak Rubber Co L
td v 
Burden (No. 2) [1972) l All ER 1210, which favoured the imposition of liability where the p
arties 
ought to have been aware of the breach of duty. On this point, see C. Harpum. "The Stran
ger as a 
Constructive Trustee" (1986) 102 LQR 114, at 152-154; R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law
 of 
Restitution, above n.87, at 718. Support for the Selangor and Karak approach can more re
cently 
be found in Baden Deluaux and Lecuit v Societe Generate etc ( 1983) BCLC 325. Howeve
r, the 
concensus among the commentators seems to be in favour of the Belmont case approach. s
ee H. 
Hanbury & R. Maudsley, above n.169, at 292. 
Dishonest and fraudulent are regarded as having the same meaning for these purposes; see,Be
lmont 
Finance Corporation ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No . 1) [1979) l All ER 118, Buckley 
L.J. at 
130. In Baden Deluaux and Lecuit v Societe Generate (1983) BCLC 325, Gibson J. stated a
t 409 
that the dishonest design was the taking of a risk to the prejudice of another's rights. which
 risk i 
known to be one which there is no right to take. A wider interpretation of the phrase (tha
t it was 
suficient if the design assisted was of a morally reprehensible character) that was sugge
sted by 
Ungoed Thomas. J. in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No . 3) [1968] 2 All ER 
1073, at 1105, was rejected in Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (N
o. 1) 
[1979) l All ER 118. See. C. Harpum, above n.170. 416. 
Belmollt Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No . 1) [1979) I All ER 118, 13
0. 
( 1942) I All ER 378. 
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good business for them, after they might have already become suspicious? Could they be 
said to be wilfully blind to the insider's breach of trust, thereby giving rise to a liability to 
account? Certainly the imposition of liability in an appropriate case on such a third party 
~ would have a beneficial effect by enhancing the degree of self-regulation of insider trading 
as brokers and other such third parties acted to protect their own positions. It is submitted, 
however, that it is by no means clear that liability would arise, for establishing the degree 
of knowledge required and the active involvement of the stockbroker in the dishonest 
design may present insurmountable difficulties.174
 Another possibility is the situation 
where the stockbroker engages in copycat trading; i.e., where the stockbroker follows, on 
his own account, the trading of a client, the client being an individual engaged in insider 
trading. It is submitted that as there is neither receipt of corporate property disposed of in 
breach of trust, nor knowing assistance in a dishonest design, it would therefore seem that 
no liability on the basis of constructive trust would arise. 
(e) AN OVERVIEW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND INSIDER TRADING 
By way of conclusion, it may be observed that the fiduciary duty approach will only stretch 
so far; and it begins to look frayed when used to impose liability on anyone not clearly in 
an immediate fiduciary relationship with the company. Another example of its limitations 
can be seen in United States v Carpenter175 , a case involving a journalist employed by the 
Wall Street Journal who told friends of the stocks which he was going to mention in his 
influential column, thus enabling them to trade in those stocks ahead of the market. 
Obviously the journalist was not in any fiduciary relationship with those persons who were 
the supposed victims of that insider trading and so this case is difficult to place within a 
fiduciary framework. However, criminal convictions were secured against the defendant 
under section 1 Ob of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the basis that he had 
misappropriated this price-sensitive information from his employer, the Wall Street 
Journal, which therefore imposed an obligation upon him to disclose such information or 
abstain from trading. This switch from considering the wrong to the persons with whom 
they traded to considering the wrong to the persons from whom they obtained the 
information is interesting, for it is the jurisprudential route which is of use for the purposes 
of civil liability in an action for breach of confidence, to which we now turn. 
174 
175 
Given that the emphasis in this category is on the third partys' involvement in the dishonest 
design of the fiduciary, it is unlikely (but not impossible) that a broker would be found liable 
without. for example, them having actually been a member of the insider trading ring. 
108 S.Ct 316 ; 98 L. Ed 2d 275 ( 1987). 
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(2) BREACH OF CONFIDENCE AND INSIDER TRADING 
The notion of a confidence may be described as the relation of intimacy or trust between 
two parties, one of whom (the confider) has imparted private or secret matters to another 
(the confidant). As noted earlier, 176 the law protects the company by enabling it to require 
persons working under service contracts to observe confidentiality by virtue of their fidelity 
covenant, expressed 177 or implied 178 .\ But a broader principle of equity is said to 
transcend this purely contractual relationship, '_'that he who has received information in 
confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it". 17 Thereby, under this equitable 
doctrine, confidences are enforceable through the action of "breach of confidence".
180 
This restriction on the use of information divulged in confidence may afford a basis for 
protecting inside information, for "if a defendant is proved to have used confidential 
information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without the consent, express or 
implied of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff's rights".
181 . 
While breach of confidence actions mainly concern trade secrets and intangible industrial 
property, the protection of price-sensitive information, whether or not amounting to 
'corporate property', is technically within this jurisdiction, certainly where it toncems the 
relationship between a company and its servants (e.g. directors). As we shall see, this 
equitable jurisdiction may be of sufficient width to encompass an action by a confider in 
respect of the unauthorised use or disclosure of unpublished price sensitive information. 
Indeed it is the very width of this jurisdiction, which may make it a valuable form of action 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
Above n.89. 
When a person. under the tenns of an express contract, agrees to communicate specific infonnation 
to another and/or permits that other to have access to material which may be a source of 
infonnation, that person can stipulate in the contract that the information communicated or 
acquired shall be kept secret and confidential, that it can only be used by the recipient for the 
purposes designated in the agreement and that it can be further communicated only to the extent 
provided in the agreement. A confidential relationship may thus be fully constituted by express 
contractual tenns. Capable of covering a wide range of inside information. such stipulations are 
common in contracts of employment, consultancy agreements, licences for the use of industrial 
infonnation and agreements giving access to financial information for the purposes of raising 
finance or obtaining credit. See. A B Consolidated v Europe Strength Food Co [ 1978] 2 NZLR 
515, 520; P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n.82, 184; J.A. Suter. The Regulation of 
Insider Dealing in Britain (Butterworths, London. 1989) I 85. 
In a contract of employment a tenn as to confidentiality may be implied. See. New Zealand 
Needle Manufacturers Ltd v Taylor [ 1975] 2 NZLR 33, 4 I; Wilson Malt Extract Co Ltd v Wilso11 
[ 1919] NZLR 659; A B Consolidated v Europe Strength F oud Co [ 1978] 2 NZLR 515. 
Seager v Copydex [ I 967] 2 All ER 415, Lord Denning at 417; Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkma11 
Ltd (1981] 2 All ER 321; A B Co11solida1ed v Europe Strength Food Co [1978] 2 NZLR 515. 
520-521. 
See. F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1984) 3. 
Saltman Engineering Co . Ltd v Campbell Eniineering Co. Lid (1963] 3 All ER 413, Lord Greene 
MR at 414. See also, Seaier v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415; Conveyer Co of Australia Pty 
Ltd v Cameron Bros E11iineerin1? Co. (1973] 2 NZLR 38, 41-42. 
37 
1 l 
i 
in the insider trading context. Despite the fact that in the Dunford & Elliott decision, 
182 
which is the only reported example of an action for breach of confidence being employed in 
an insider trading type scenario, the Court declined to grant the relief sought, the analysis 
of this case which is carried out below183 would suggest that, on a different set of facts, 
misuse of inside information may be actionable as a breach of confidence. 
The essence of the cause of action in all cases is the unauthorised use or disclosure of 
confidential information which is imparted in such circumstances as to import an obligation 
of confidence. 184 What must now be considered, is whether or not these requirements 
would be difficult to fulfil in the context of insider trading, • 
(a) THE QUALITY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
A key requirement is that the information possesses the requisite degree of confidentiality to 
merit protection. It must not be something which is "public property and public 
knowledge". 185 Where, however, the information is in part public and in part private then 
the confidant's position remains tainted by his knowledge of the private information, such 
that they must not act on any such information until all of the information has been 
published to the public. 186 As price-sensitive information of the nature with which we are 
concerned is unpublished, it would logically be assumed that such information would not 
be considered as being in the public domain and thus clearly satisfies this requirement. 
However, .a problem which exists in the insider trading context is that company's often 
have the need to consult various advisers, which in all probability necessitates the 
disclosure of such information to these parties. As a result a number of people within the 
company and outside of it may be aware of this information. Such a limited disclosure to 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
[1977) 1 Lloyd's Rep 505. 
See, below n.188. 
In Coco v A. N. Clcn-k (Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41. Megarry J stated at 47 that to enforce a 
duty of confidence it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove three elements: 
(a) the infonnation had the necessary quality of confidence; 
(b) it must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and
 
(c) there must have been an unauthorised use to the detriment of the plaintiff. 
See also, Seager v Copydex [1967] 2 All ER 415; Saltma11 E11gineeri11g Co Ltd v Campbell
 
Engineering Ltd [1963) 3 All ER 413; Terrapin Ltd v Builders ' Supply Co (/-/ayes) Ltd [1960]
 
RPC 128. The Coco case approach has been followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in A
 
B Consolidated v Europe Strength Co [1978] 2 NZLR 515, at 520. 
Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell E11gineeri11g Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 413; Lord Greene M.
 
R. at 415. See also, Thomas Marshall (Expons) Lid v Gui11le [1979] l Ch 227. 248; Conveyer
 
Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Cameron Bros E11gi11eeri11g Co . [ 1973) 2 NZLR 38, 42; A B 
Consolidated v Europe Strength Food Co [ 1978] 2 NZLR 515, 52 l. 
See. ScherinR Chemicals Ltd v Fa/kman [1981) 2 All ER 321; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967) 2 All 
ER 415 ; Terrapin v Builders' Supply Co (/-/ayes) Ltd [1960] RPC 128. 
38 
these advisers for a limited purpose does not necessarily mean that the information h
as been 
put into the public domain by the company so as to deprive it of the necessary elem
ent of 
confidentiality. 187 ~ever, there is obviously a dividing line to be drawn, such t
hat the 
company must take care not to disclose the information to such a degree that the
 courts 
would regard it as having lost that confidentiality, as in Dunford & Elliott Ltd v Johnson
 & 
Firth Brown Ltd. 1'88 J In this case, the plaintiffs, a company that was engaged in 
steelmaking, sustained very severe trading losses of about £ 1 million annually
 in the 
previous two years, and therefore decided to make a rights issue to their shareholder
s to the 
amount of £3 million. The combined institutional shareholders of this company ow
ned 43 
per cent of the issued shares. At a meeting between the plaintiff company a
nd the 
institutional shareholders it was suggested that the institutional shareholde
rs (the 
"consortium") should underwrite this rights issue since very few ordinary shareh
olders 
were expected to take up the rights issue. The plaintiff company's financial a
dvisers 
prepared a report of the company's financial prospects for the next financial ye
ar and 
disclosed it to the consortium under a stipulation of confidence. The cons
ortium 
considered that £3million would not be sufficient to save the plaintiff company and
 that at 
least another£ 1 million was needed. So it was decided by the consortium alone t
hat the 
defendants, a rival steelmaking company, and another company should be invited to
 come 
in and each underw~ite £500,000. The consortium thought that if the defendant
s were 
invited to underwrite £500,000 each they ought to see the confidential infor
mation 
contained within the financial report. The defendants were given the information,
 which 
was, of course, not available to shareholaers other than the consortium, but the defe
ndants 
subsequently declined to underwrite the plaintiff company. However, the defendan
ts later 
made a press announcement stating that they were making an offer to the sharehol
ders in 
the plaintiff company to purchase their shares. Under the terms of this of
fer the 
defendants would pay 35p per share, whereas the current market price was 17p a
 share. 
The plaintiff company issued a writ claiming an injunction to forbid the defendant's
 use of 
the confidential information contained within the financial report, so as to restra
in this 
takeover bid. The English Court of Appeal focused upon the fact that confidential fin
ancial 
information concerning the company had been disclosed to a group of shareholders h
olding 
43 per cent of the equity capital (but not to other shareholders) as well as other prosp
ective 
underwriters of a rights issue by that company. Therefore, in the circumstances 
of this 
187 
188 
In the decision of Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149, Cross J. noted at 153 tha
t whether an item 
of infonnation is still confidential after being disclosed to a certain class of p
ersons "must be a 
question of degree depending on the particular case, but if relative secrecy remain
s, the plaintiff can 
still succeed.'' See, J.A. Suter. The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain 
. above n.20. 188-
189. 
[ I 977] I Lloyd's Rep 505. Allhough the English Court of Appeal declined 
to grant the releif 
sought. an analysis of this case would appear to suggest that. on a different set 
of facts. misuse of 
inside information could be a breach of confidence. 
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case the Court reasoned that such a widespread use of the information "drives a hole into 
the blanket of confidence", 189 so as to deprive it of a confidential quality which it would 
have otherwise possessed. 
As to the substance of the information, there is no requirement that it be of momentous 
importance in order to possess the requisite degree of confidentiality. All types of 
unpublished price sensitive information could be classified as confidential , whether the 
information relates to internally generated information such as annual figures , profit 
forecasts, or possible take-over plans, or whether it is information obtained in negotiations 
with other companies concerning joint ventures, possible agreed mergers etc. The 
information must be specific, in the sense that it must not be general information inevitably 
acquired by an employee in the ordinary course of their employment as part of their stock 
of knowledge, for an employer cannot attempt to constrain an employee when they leave 
their employment from using such knowledge.
190 An employee can, however, be 
prevented from using a specific item of confidential information, and since this element of 
specificity is inherent in the nature of unpublished price-sensitive information 
19 1, this 
requirement should be satisfied. The only other limit to the type of information which 
might be confidential appears to be that it must not be mere " tittle tattle"
192, but since it is 
unlikely in any event that information which is price-sensitive would be regarded as tittle 
tattle, this restriction will be of little consequence in the insider trading context. 
(b) THE OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE 
Having ascertained that the information does possess the requisite quality of confidence, 
the next issue is to decide whether it has been imparted in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confidence. The confider must have disclosed the information for a limited 
purpose and any use or disclosure of it by the confidant for any other purpose will be 
prohibited by the obligation of confidence, provided that the confidant knew or ought to 
have known that the information was being imparted for a limited purpose.
193 Disc losure 
by the confider in this context includes verbal or written disclosure to the confidant.
194 
189 
190 
19 I 
192 
193 
[1977] l Lloyd 's Rep 505 , Lord Denning M. R. at 509. See J .A. Suter, The Regulation of In s
ider 
Dealillg ill Britain ,above n.20. 192-1 93. 
Herbert Morris v Saxe/by [1916] l AC 688; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] l All
 ER 
617 . 
Unpublished price sensitive information by its nature re lates to a specific item of confide
ntial 
infonnalion i.e ., a finan cial report. Such information can o f co urse be specific even thoug
h it 
only relates to a contemplated transaction. such as a poss ible takeover bid. 
Coco v A . N . Clark ( Engineers) Ltd [ 1969] RPC 41 , Megarry J . at 48: A B Co 11so lidated v Eu
rope 
Strength Food Co [1 978] 2 NZLR 515 , 521. 
Morris v Moat ( 1851 ) 9 Hare 241 : Lamb v Evan s ( 1892) 3 Ch 462; Terrapin Ltd v Build
ers ' 
Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1960] RPC 128: Saltman E11gineerin g Co Ltd v Campbell E11ginee
ring 
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The key then is to establish disclosure in circumstances where the confidant knew or ought 
to have known that the unpublished price sensitive information was being imparted for a 
limited purpose. In detennining whether the defendant actually knew of the obligation, the 
courts will obviously be greatly assisted by any express contractual term spelling out the 
requirement of confidentiality, and many employment contracts entered into by directors 
will include such a provision. 195 Similarly, many agreements between companies and 
their professional advisers will specifically impose an obligation of confidentiality.
196 An 
interesting example of such a requirement of confidentiality is provided in the Dunford & 
Elliott decision. 197 In this case, the plaintiff company's financial advisers produced a 
report on the plaintiff's financial prospects and disclosed it to the institutional shareholders 
(the "consortium") under a stipulation that the information was confidential and was not to 
be used in any way to influence investment decisions. The English Court of Appeal found 
that in view of the presence of such a stipulation, this information had thereby been 
imparted in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence.
198 
Even in the absence of a direct contractual obligation between the parties it may be possible 
to establish from the evidence that the confidant knew of the obligation of confidence, as in 
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd. 199 In this case the court thought it obvious from 
the facts that the defendant actually knew of the requirement of confidentiality even if it was 
not established that it had been expressly stated to him and even though he was not in a 
contractual relationship with the plaintiffs.20° Cases involving actual knowledge of an 
obligation of confidentiality are usually quite straightforward, the difficulties arise when it 
is asserted that the confidant ought to have known of such an obligation. 
194 
195 
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200 
Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 413; Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 321; A B 
Consolidated v Europe Strength Food [1978] 2 NZLR 515, 522-523. 
Terrapin Ltd v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1960] RPC 128; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 
All ER 415. 
See, for example, Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] l Ch. 227. where the defendant 
was appointed managing director of the plaintiff company under a contract of employment wh
ich 
included an express tenn stating that he was not to engage in any other business without 
the 
company's consent while he was employed as managing director; and that during and after
 his 
employment he was not "to disclose" confidential infonnation in relation to the affairs. custom
ers 
or trade secrets of the company. After ceasing to be managing director he was neither "to use
 or 
disclose" confidential infonnation about the suppliers and customers of the company. See also
, A 
B Consolidated Food v Europe Strength Co [ 1978) 2 NZLR 515 , 520. 
See, for example, Dunford & Elliot Ltd v Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd [1977] l Lloyd's Rep 505. 
[1977] l Lloyd's Rep 505. 
[ I 977] I Lloyd's Rep 505, 509. See, above n. I 88 
[1981] 2 All ER 321. See, below n.221. 
[1981] 2 All ER 321, Shaw L.J. at 336; Templeman L.J. at 342. See. below n.221. See al
so. 
Reid & Sigrist Ltd v Moss & Mechanism Ltd [1932] 49 RPC 461. involving a chief 
draughtsman, where the court took the view that this was so important a position that it w
as 
obvious to anyone in such a position that they must observe the confidentiality of the infonnat
ion 
that they obtained. 
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In determining whether the confidant ought to have known, the courts are helped
 by the 
reasonable man approach that was put forward by Megarry J. in Coco v A. N. C
lark 
(Engineers) Ltd :201 
"It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man standing in 
the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon
 
reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this
 
should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence. In
 
particular where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a
 
business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind ... I would
 
regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that 
he was bound by an obligation of confidence." 
Applying this "reasonable man" approach to the standard insider trading scenario it
 
seems clear that many of the people in receipt of unpublished price-sensitive
 
information do indeed receive it on this basis and cannot deny an obligation of
 
confidence. 
Company Directors and Officers 
Consider the most obvious insiders, the company's own directors and officers. Th
ey may 
well have actual knowledge of the obligation of confidence but even if they have 
not, the 
courts should have no hesitation in finding that they ought to have known, as s
uch an 
obligation arises naturally from these positions.
292 Indeed in Baker v Gibbons 
Pennycuick V.C. accepted that the prohibition on the unauthorised use or disclo
sure of 
20 1 
202 
[ 1969] RPC 41, Megarry J. at 4 7. The plaintiff in this case designed a moped engin
e and sought 
the co-operation of the defendants in its manufacture. After the plaintiff disclosed
 to the defendants 
all the details of his design and proposals for its manufacture, the parties fell out a
nd the defendants 
decided to manufacture their own engine. When the defendants brought out their 
own design which 
closely resembled the plaintiffs, he brought a motion for an interlocutory injunct
ion to restrain the 
defendants from misusing information communicated to them in confidence so le
ly for the purpose 
of the joint venture. The defendants denied that any confidential information had
 been supplied to 
them , or used by them in the engine they had manufactured. 
See , Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [ I 966] RPC 8 I , where Ros
kill J. observed at 
98 that the absence of an express term in the managing directors contract of emp
loyment does not 
prevent an obligation of confidence being implied by the court: ·· ... I have not lo
st sight of the fact 
that the heads of agreement unlike the draft service agreement which Bryan
t refused to sign. 
contained no express obligation not to divulge confidential information, b
ut this makes no 
difference, for. were it necessary , I would not hesitate to imply into the contra
ct of employment 
between Bryant and the plaintiffs the relevant obligation. It is both reasonable an
d necessary to do 
so." See also, Conveyer Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Cameron Br(ls Engineer
ing Co [ 1973] 2 
NZLR 38, 41. 
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confidential information applied with "particular force" as between a director a
nd their 
company, given the fiduciary nature of the position which they occupy.203 
Professional Advisers and Outside Consultants 
The same applies where a company discloses such information to professional advi
sers and 
outside consultants. They are covered by an obligation of confidence for in 
all these 
instances, the information is disclosed for a limited purpose which the confidant 
ought to 
have realised is the only legitimate purpose for which they may use that infor
mation. 
Thus, bankers204, brokers205 , lawyers
206 , accountants207 , sub-contractors208 , and 
outside consultants209 have all attracted obligations of confidence. This is also 
the case 
where unpublished price-sensitive information is disclosed to another company wit
h a view 
to a joint venture which later falls through.
210 The position of other advisers, such as 
advertising agencies and public relations firms, has yet to be confronted in the co
urts but 
there is no reason why they too would not be affected by an obligation of confiden
ce in the 
appropriate circumstances. Certainly an advertising agency briefed about an im
minent 
take-over bid would have obtained information in circumstances which wa
rrant an 
obligation of confidentiality. That this is so is reinforced by Shaw L.J. in Sche
ring 
Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd, who noted that:2
11 
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209 
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[1972) 2 All ER 759, 764-765. The defendant company in this case carried on
 the business of 
marketing a specialised item of building insulation. For that purpose it emp
loyed 16 selling 
agents who each covered a specific area in the United Kingdom. The plaintiff
 after joining the 
company, became a director. He was later removed from office and thereafter se
t up a competing 
business. In proceedings instituted by the plaintiff against the company and two
 of its directors. 
the company made a counterclaim and applied for an interlocutory injunctio
n to restrain the 
plaintiff from soliciting agents of the company to terminate their employmen
t and to join the 
plaintiff's competing business.This claim was based on an equitable obligation u
nder the general 
law (as oppossed to an express or implied contractual term) not to use confidentia
l information. It 
was contended by the company that, where a person. particularly the director of
 a company, had 
obtained confidential information they could not use it to the prejudice of the peso
n who had given 
it and that the names and actresses of the agents was confidential information o
btained from the 
company without which it would have been impossible for the plaintiff to solic
it the company's 
agents. See also. the observation of Roskill J. at 91 in Cranleigh Precision Engineer
ing Ltd v 
Bryant [1966) RPC 81. 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [ I 924 J 1 KB 46 l. 
See, Brown v IRC [1965) AC 244. 
Parry-Jones v Law Society [ I 968) I Ch 1; Lord Ashburton v Pape [ 1913) 2 Ch 46
9. 
Parry-Jones v Law Society [1968) I Ch 1, Lord Denning at 7, Lord Diplock at 9. 
Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Ltd [1963) 3 All ER 413. 
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [19811 2 All ER 321. See, below n.221. 
Seager v Copydex Ltd [ I 967) 2 All ER 415. 
[1981] 2 All ER 321, 337. See, below n.221. See, also Dunford & Elliou Ltd v Joh
nson & 
Firth Brown Ltd [1977) I Lloyd's Rep 505, per Lord Denning M.R. at 509: "As
 between men of 
business, when one gives information to another on a stipulation or unders
tanding that the 
infonnation is to be regarded as confidential - and not passed on by the recipient t
o others - such a 
stipulation or understanding will usually be enforced by the law." 
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" ... the communication in a commercial context of information which at the 
time is regarded by the giver and recognised by the recipient as confidential, 
and the nature of which has a material connection with the commercial 
interests of the party confiding that information, imposes on the recipient a 
fiduciary obligation to maintain that confidence thereafter unless the giver 
consents to relax it." 
Employer and Employee 
A further possibility is the unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information by an 
employee of the company or an employee of the professional advisers, outside consultants, 
etc, in whom the company has confided. Confidential communications between employer 
and employee are firmly rooted in the law of contract.
212 Here the starting point is that all 
employees (as agents of their employees) owe their employers a duty of fidelity, one aspect 
of which is an obligation to respect the confidentiality of information obtained in the course 
of their employment.213 Use of such information for the employee's own purposes is a 
breach of that duty. 214 Thus, any employee of the company will be in breach of an 
obligation owed to the company Uust as any breach by an employee of a professional 
adviser would be a breach of the duty owed to the professional adviser) where the 
information is used by the employee for the purposes of insider trading. Although the 
authorities are not absolutely clear on the point, it seems that this obligation of fidelity and 
with it the obligation of confidence will arise in the case of all employees, whatever the 
position held by them.215 . The only qualification to this general obligation arises in cases 
where the employer has been very casual about the confidentiality of the information which 
they are now seeking to prevent a former employee from using. In United f ndigo 
Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson, for example, the court refused relief where the plaintiffs had 
never pointed out to the employee that the information was confidential, nor had they 
placed any constraints on access to that information on their workforce.
216 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
See, P. Mitchell, Insider Dealing and Director's Duties (2nd ed. Butterworths, London. 1989)
 28. 
However, while the duty of faithful service ceases with the ending of the contract of employ
ment. 
the duty to respect the confidentiality of infonnation does not. See, P. Mitchell. above n.212, 
28 .. 
See, Lamb v Evans (1893) I Ch 218; Amber Si:e and Chemical Co Ltd v Menzel (1913] 
2 Ch 
239; Wessex Dairies Ltd v Smith (1935] 2 KB 80; Thomas Marshall (Exporters) Ltd v Guinle 
(1979] l Ch 227; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler (19861 l All ER 617. 
See, F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence, above n.180, 180. 
[ 1932] 49 RPC 178. In this case the defendant was fonnerly employed as works manager 
by the 
plaintiff company which manufactured chemicals. After the defendant left the plaintiff's serv
ice, he 
established a business as a manufacturer of chemicals and dyes. and marketed a product whi
ch the 
plaintiff's claimed was manufactured with the use of secret processes learnt during the course
 of his 
employment with them. The Court refused to grant an injunction restraining the defendan
t from 
using the knowledge he had acquired during his employment by reason of the fact tha
t, the 
44 
Finally, it should be reiterated that in an action for breach of confidence founded upon the 
equitable ground a confidant can only be liable for misuse of information where such 
information is proven to be confidential.217 Where an action is brought against a former 
employee, this requirement of confidentiality is reinforced by "the principle that the courts 
will refuse to prevent a man earning his living by using the knowledge, skill and expertise 
he has acquired as his own and will refuse to treat its use as an actionable breach of 
confidence."218 A distinction must be drawn, therefore, between the employee's ordinary 
stock of knowledge about securities markets, which they are free to use after the 
termination of their employment, and the employer's confidential information, which the 
employee is bound not to use for his own purposes after he has left his employer's 
service. 219 
An Action By The Company Against Employees of Confidants 
A further contingency which must be given consideration, is whether the company itself 
has a cause of action against an offending employee of anyone in whom the company has 
confided, such as a professional adviser. Clearly an action could not be based on any duty 
of fidelity, because the company is not the individual's employer. However, despite this 
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties an action may still be brought on 
the basis of the general equitable jurisdiction.220 In Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman 
Ltd221 the plaintiff company (Schering) attempted to restrain the defendants from 
broadcasting a television documentary said to have been compiled using confidential 
information imparted by the plaintiffs in confidence to the defendants. Schering had been 
facing adverse publicity concerning a drug which it produced and to counter that publicity it 
had employed the defendant company of television training specialists (Falkman) to advise 
its directors and executives on how to present the company ' s case when being interviewed 
2 17 
2 18 
219 
220 
22 1 
defendant had not been told at any stage that what he learnt during his service was to be regarded as 
confidential , and he had acquired the knowledge honestl y and in c ircumstances in which the 
knowledge was freely available to all of his fellow workers without any constraints imposed by the 
management. See al so, F. Gurry , Breach of Co11fide11ce. above n.180, 18 1. 
See, above n. 190. 
Ansell Rubber Co. Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber !11dustries Pty Ltd (1972] RPC 8 11 , Gowans J . at 
818. See, also Facce11da Chicke11 Ltd v Fowler (1986] I All ER 617, 625-626. 
See F. Gurry , Breach of Confidence, above n. 180, 199. 
This was clearly established in Saltman Engineering Ltd v Campbell E11gi11 eeri11g Ltd (1963] 3 All 
ER 413 , where there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, who 
had obtained the plaintiff' s designs with a view to manufacturing certain products for them. but 
who then purported to use the design s for them selves. The court found that an obligation of 
confidence was establi shed in these circumstances despite the absence of any contractual 
relationship between the parties. 
( 1981] 2 All ER 321. 
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by the media. Falkrnan in turn obtained the services of the second defendant, Elstein , a 
broadcaster, to assist in the project. Elstein subsequently sought to make a documentary 
about the company using much of the information obtained from the training course. On 
the facts , the English Court of Appeal found that an obligation of confidence existed 
between Schering and Elstein directly, despite the absence of any contract, on the basis that 
the information was confidential and had been obtained by Elstein in circumstances where it 
was obvious to him that the information had been disclosed for the limited purposes of the 
training course only. In the appropriate circumstances therefore not only professional 
advisers but also outside consultants brought in by them and indeed their own employees 
may each be subject to a direct obligation of confidence to the original confider 
company.222 
An Action By The Company Against A Third Party Tippee' 
In addition to treating people such as Elstein with no direct relationship to the confider as 
confidants, liability can also be extended to third party recipients, who obtain the 
information , directly or indirectly, from the confidant in breach of that confidant 's 
obligation of confidence. Such a third party recipient in insider trading terminology is of 
course categorised as a ' tippee ' . The liability of such third party recipients was also 
considered in Schering223 where the third defendant, Thames Television, in addition to the 
defendants Falkrnan and Elstein, was restrained from broadcasting the program in breach 
of confidence, on the basis that having chosen to employee Elstein in making the film with 
full knowledge of how he came to be in possession of the information about the company, 
they were thereby in no better a position than Elstein himself. In the words of Templeman 
L.J. 224 " [t]he confidentiality which attaches to Elstein attaches likewise to Thames 
Television." It has long been established that any third party who receives confidential 
information with actual knowledge225 that they are receiving it in breach of confidence will 
be restrained from using it.226 However, the learned commentator Francis Gurry suggests 
that this will also be the case where the third party ought to have known of the breach.
227 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
See. F. Gurry , Breach of Confidence . above n.1 80. 286-287. 
(1981] 2 All ER 321. 
(1981] 2 All ER 321 , 346. 
It is probable that wilful abstention from enquiries which if made would give the third party 
knowledge of the breach will suffice. See London & Provin cial Sportin g News Agency Ltd v 
Levey (1928) Macg. Cop.Cas. 340; discussed in F. Gurry. Breach of Confidence. above n.180. 
272-273. 
Morrison v Moar ( 1851 ) 9 Hare 241 ; Ashburron v Pape [ I 9 13] 2 Ch 469 ; Argyll v Argyll [ 1967] 
Ch 302; Fraser v Thames Television (1984) QB 44 . See. also, lnfometrics Business Services Ltd 
v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand. Unreported. 7 September I 987 , High Court . 
Wellington Registry CP363/87, where Eichelbaum J. s tated at 4 that notice to a third party 
recipient of the" ·surreptitious' obtaining of ... information" by the confidant was sufficient to 
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(c) BREACH OF DUTY 
Where an obligation of confidentiality has been established, the confidant will be liable for 
any use or disclosure of that confidential information for any purpose other than that for 
which it was confided. 228 This would clearly preclude the use or disclosure of 
unpublished price-sensitive information for the purpose of insider trading. It has been 
suggested in the past that it was necessary to establish that the authorised use or disclosure 
resulted in detriment to the confider,229 but that requirement seems to have lapsed, 
although it may have a bearing on the appropriate remedy. 230 This eliminates the 
difficulties which might arise where a company wishes to sue for breach of confidence 
because as we have seen, the company is not always directly affected adversely by insider 
trading. 23 1 There is also no requirement that the unauthorised use or disclosure be 
intentional so that a cause of action may lie even if the defendant has subconsciously used 
or disclosed the information. 232 Thus unthinking disclosure , as where a director 
unwittingly lets slip some unpublished price sensitive information in the course of casual 
conversation, may found a cause of action against the director if all the other necessary 
elements can be established. 
In the event of breach, any action must be brought by the confider as the person who is 
entitled to have the confidence respected.233 Thereby, a cause of action against a confidant 
indulging in insider trading on the basis of confidential information obtained by virtue of 
their position, again rests in the hands of the company rather than in the hands of any 
individual victim of the insider trading. 
(d) REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF DUTY 
The remedies available for breach of confidence are damages, an account of profits, an 
injunction and the delivery up or destruction of the item in question . As far as insider 
trading is concerned, obviously delivery up or destruction is irrelevant and so, generally, 
227 
22 8 
229 
230 
23 1 
232 
233 
support m1 action by the confider for breach of confidence against the third party recipient of such 
confidential information , where the original confidant was in breach of an obligation of confidence. 
F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence , above n.180, 274 . 
Saltman Engineerin g Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Ltd [ 1963) 2 All ER 41 3, Lord Greene 
M.R. at 414 . 
Coco v A. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 , 48 . See, F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence, 
above n.170, 407-408. 
F. Gurry, above n.180, 407-408. 
Above n.37. 
See. Sea,?er v Copyciex Ltd [1967) 2 All ER 415 , 41 8-419 . 
Fraser v Evans [ 1969) I QB 349 . 
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would be injunctive relief, given that persons engaging in insider trading are most unlikely 
to advertise their intentions in advance. 234 The key remedies, therefore, will be the 
pecuniary ones of damages and the equitable remedy of an account of profits; the plaintiff 
must choose between these remedies.235 In practice a plaintiff will almost invariably elect 
to claim damages because of the difficulties associated with an action for account.236 
An Account Of Profits 
The purpose of the equitable remedy of an account of profits is to compel the defendant to 
surrender those profits which were improperly made. 237 On its face such a remedy would 
appear to be suitable in the context of insider trading so that persons engaging in this 
activity will be required to account for their ill-gotten gains. However, a problem often 
encountered in the setting of abuse of confidential information, is the calculation of profits, 
for the defendant can only be required to account for those profits which are attributable to 
such a breach of duty. 238 In an insider trading situation it is theoretically difficult to 
identify the percentage of any profits gained239 which can be ascribed to the misuse of 
confidential information as such profits will have been achieved by the mixture of the 
insider trader's personal knowledge of market conditions with the confidential price 
sensitive information. The difficulties with such a calculation are compounded by the fact 
that there will undoubtedly be other factors at work in the securities market at the time when 
the insider trading took place which may also have contributed in a certain degree to the 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
However, in the context of a takeover injunctive releif may be appropriate in order to restrain the 
takeover bid of an insider. See for example, Dunford & Elliot Ltd v Johnso11 & Firth Brown Ltd. 
above n.188. 
Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Coresets Silhouette [1963] RPC 45. Pennycuick J. at 58; 
Vancamp Chocolates Ltd V Auslebrooks Ltd [1984] I NZLR 354. 361; Ansell Rubber Co. Pty 
Ltd v Alied Rubber Industries Pty. Ltd [1972] RPC 811, Gowans J. at 828. See, F. Gurry, Breach 
of Confidence, above n.180. 417-418. 
An action for account has generally been regarded as an unsatisfactory and cumbersome procedure 
because of the practical difficulties associated with the calculation of the defendant's wrongful 
profits. See, for example, Siddell v Vickers [1892] 9 RPC 152, where Lindley L.J. stated at 162: 
"The plaintiff therefore was perfectly within his right in electing, as he did in this case, to have an 
account of profits; but I do not know any form of account which is more difficult to work out, or 
may be more difficult to work out than an account of profits." While Lindley L.J.'s criticism was 
dealing with the procedure in a partnership context his views are of general application. See also. 
F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence .above n.180. 418-419: A.S. Burrows. Remedies for Torts and 
Breach of Contract (Butterworths, London, 1987) 263-269. 
Slade J. reaffirmed this central principle in the following classic statement in My Ki11da Tow11 Ltd 
v Soll [1982] FSR 147, at 156: "The purpose of ordering an account of profits in favour of a 
successful plaintiff ... is not to inflict punishment on the defendant. It is to prevent an unjust 
enrichment of the defendant by compelling him to surrender those parts of the profits, actually 
made by him which were improperly made and nothing beyond this." See, A.S. Burrows. above 
n.236. 266. 
See, A.S. Burrows. above n.236. 266. 
As pointed out earlier. there is some doubt as to whether an insider who has used price sensitive 
information in selling their existing shareholdings. thereby avoiding a loss that would otherwise 
be suffered. can be said to have made a profit. See. above n.104. 
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wrongdoer's profits.240 A solution to this problem may however be at hand if the courts 
elect to adopt the approach outlined by Pennycuick J. in Peter Pan Manufacturing Ltd v 
Corsets Silhouette Ltd.241 Under this approach, a person must account for all of the 
profits which they have made from a certain activity, where such profits could not have 
been achieved at all without the misuse of confidential information. Obviously this would 
require a finding that profits gained by means of insider trading may properly be viewed as 
being of such a nature that they would not have come into existence without the use of 
confidential inside information. 
Damages 
As for an action for damages, here too, there are difficulties in the context of insider 
trading. Where the obligation of confidence is based on contract, either express or 
implied, then damages will be available as a normal contractual remedy. Thus damages are 
awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff (confider) in the position in which they 
would have been had the contract been performed by the confidant.242 However, if the 
obligation is an equitable one damages are to be recovered on a tortious basis, so that the 
plaintiff (confider) is to be placed in the position they would have been if the breach of 
confidence had not been committed.243 Furthermore, if the obligation is an equitable one 
then damages may be available in lieu of or in addition to an injunction.24
4 
In either case the purpose of the damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss caused 
to them by the breach.245 This can be something of a problem as far as insider trading is 
concerned, for the plaintiff is most likely to be a company suing a confidant or a 
professional adviser suing an errant employee, neither of whom is likely to have suffered 
any loss other than some intangible and perhaps unquantifiable loss of reputation or 
standing. Of course there may be direct damage to the company if the insider trading has 
240 
241 
242 
243 
244 
245 
For example, where there is a bull market for those shares, it may be difficult to determine what 
percentage of the profit is attributable to the state of the market and what percentage is attributable 
to the misuse of confidential information. 
[ I 963] 3 All ER 402. This was a case involving the misuse of confidential information relating 
to the manufacture of a particular kind of brassiere. Here the defendant was held liable for all of 
the profits it had made through the sale of such articles. As Pennycuick J put it at 413, this was 
because "the manufacture of the article in question of itself involved the use of confidential 
infonnation and Silhouette [the defendant] could not have manufactured that article at all without 
the use of the confidential infonnation". The New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted this formula 
in A B Consolidated Food Co v Europe Strength Co [ I 978] 2 NZLR 515. 
F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence. above n.180, 364. 
Seager v Copydex Ltd (no.2) [1969] I WLR 809, 813 and 815. See. also F. Gurry. Breach of 
Confidence, above n.180, 364-365. 
F. Gurry. Breach of Confidence. above n.180, 364-365. 
F. Gurry. Breach of Confidence. above n.180, 364. 
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taken place in the shares of a take-over target which results in an increase to the company's 
cost for acquiring that target. But here too it is very difficult to quantify the loss suffered 
by the company, for there may be many other factors at work in the market which, along 
with the insider trading, contribute to the increase in the target's share price. 
However a possible solution may lie in the English Court of Appeal's approach to the 
assessment of damages for breach of confidence under the equitable jurisdiction in Seager v 
Copydex Ltd (No. 2).246 The court in this case held that damages were to be assessed at 
the "market value" of the information which the defendants had misused. 
247 This 
approach has been criticised by Gurry as being inconsistent with the basic purpose of 
damages which is to compensate the plaintiff for the actual loss they have suffered. 
248 In 
any event the English Court of Appeal in Dowson & Mason Ltd v Potter249 has now 
stressed that Seager v Copydex Ltd (No. 2) does not lay down a general principle but 
simply reflects the fact that in the circumstances of that particular case, the loss to that 
individual plaintiff was indeed the market value of the information, which they would have 
sold since they did not intend to exploit this information themselves. Therefore the 
principle that damages should compensate the plaintiff for their actual loss remains the 
essential approach in assessing damages, with all the difficulties which that entails in the 
insider trading context. 
246 
247 
248 
249 
[1969] 1 WLR 809. In this case the defendant company was negotiating for the marketing rights 
of a patented carpet grip, which the plaintiff firm had invented, and was now willing to sell to the 
defendant company. During an interview with the defendant company's assistant general manager 
and sales manager the plaintiff tried to interest them in an alternative device which they had 
invented called an "Invisigrip" ,which the plaintiff had not yet patented. The information was given 
in confidence. The defendant company were not at the time interested in the alternative device. 
Subsequently. negotiations regarding marketing the patented grip having broken down. the 
defendant company applied for a patent in respect of a carpet grip very similar to the alternative 
device (the "Invisigrip") , citing the assistant general manager as the inventor. The English Court 
of Appeal having found that the defendant company had made use. albeit honestly, of information 
which they received in confidence from the plaintiff, and which was not available to the public, 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for breach of confidence, the damages to be assessed 
on the basis of reasonable compensation for the use of the confidential infonnation. 
[ 1969] I WLR 809. per Lord Denning MR at 256. per Salman L.J. and Winn L.J. concurring at 
257. 
F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence. above n.180, at 444. "It is an assessment more in keeping with a 
quantum meruit award or award for reasonable recompense for services rendered". See. G. Jones. 
"Restitution of Benefits obtained in Breach of Another"s Confidence·· ( 1970) 86 LQR 463. where it 
is suggested at 488-491 that such an asessment based on quantum meruit could be usefully 
employed in breach of confidence cases. 
[ 1986] 2 All ER 418, Sir Edward Eveleigh at 422; Stocker L.J. at 424; Slade L.J. at 424-425. 
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(3) CONCLUSION ON COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR INSIDER 
TRADING 
The common law relating to fiduciary duties is clearly inadequate to deal with the problem 
of insider trading because as we have observed,250 many persons who may have the 
opportunity to engage in insider trading will not be liable to account under existing 
equitable rules as they are not in sufficient proximity to the company or its shareholders to 
give rise to a fiduciary relationship. This problem is partly mitigated by the law relating to 
an action for breach of confidence based upon the general equitable jurisdiction which may 
operate to extend civil liability for insider trading to those persons who are not in an 
immediate fiduciary or contractual relationship with the company, but who nevertheless 
may be privy tc;> price-sensitive information by virtue of the privileged or restricted position 
which the occupy (e.g. a director of an entirely separate company who has been negotiating 
with the confiding company in question with regard to a possible joint venture or merger 
between these two entities). 
However, even where such an action for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of confidence 
may lie against those persons indulging in insider trading, a further obstacle to relief is 
created by virtue of the fact that the company is virtually the sole beneficiary of fiduciary 
obligations imposed upon insiders,251 while in the context of a breach of confidence, any 
action must also be brought by the company, as the company will be the confiding party 
who is entitled to have the confidence respected. 252 Thereby , an action for breach of 
fiduciary duty or breach of confidence will almost always rest in the hands of the company 
rather than the individual "victim" (i.e., a former or existing shareholder) of such insider 
trading. The result of this is that proceedings are unlikely to be taken against directors or 
other persons who have engaged in insider trading, where the defendant retains defacto 
control over the company (as in the Regal case253 ), especially as it seems that the courts 
have no power to prevent defendants who are shareholders from voting at the general 
meeting.254 For normally the decision to commence proceedings is taken by the board of 
directors as a business judgement incidental to their management of the company,
255 
however, it is well settled that if the directors do not commence proceedings (as may be the 
case if they are the potential defendants) the power to bring an action reverts to the general 
250 
25 l 
252 
253 
254 
255 
Above r0!_2. 
See, above n.134. 
See, above n.233. 
Supra, n.110. 
Mason v Harris ( 1879) 11 Ch D 97. 
See, Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113. 
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meeting.256 There is also very little incentive for an individual shareholder who is the 
victim of any such insider trading to pursue a derivative action for breach of confidence or 
fiduciary obligation on behalf of the company against an insider, as any financial relief that 
may be recovered would be granted to the company rather than the shareholder.
257 The 
likelihood of proceedings by the company is further reduced in that a company may well be 
reluctant to take proceedings against a director or other fiduciaries closely associated with 
the company where such an action might "cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure 
stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the corporation ' s securities".
258 
From the foregoing it is apparent that although civil liability for insider trading on the basis 
of breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty may technically be very brof1d , 
enforcement difficulties have devalued such proceedings to the extent that the risk of any 
such action against an insider may be minimal. Thus, legislative intervention in the form 
of Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 was required in order to provide an 
effective remedy and deterrent for the practice of insider trading. 
256 
257 
258 
See, Pender v Lushington ( I 877) 6 Ch D 70. 
See, above n.129 . 
Diamond v Oreamuno 248 NE 2d 910, 9 12 ( l 969). 
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PART IY 
4. A~ o, ER' IE\V OF PART I OF THE E l'RITIE 
A~IEND~IE~T ACT 1988 
Pan I of the Securitie · Amendment A.et 19 :L> lthe A ·t) ,, hich came into force on 22 
December 19 introduced for the fir t time in ~ew Zealand an expre ·s prohibiti n JgJinst 
insider trading without resort to the need to establi ·h the existence of fiduciar,· or L ther .... , 
duties. The in ider trading provi-ions contained within Part I of the Act haw been 
designed to gi e statutory effect to that concept known to ·ecuritie , markets as ··disclose or 
abstain··. In the, ords of the New Zealand Securitie · Comrnis ·ion in its Report to the 
Minister of Justice on Insider Trading. 2.59 
"The basis of the principles [sic] is adopted from the concept known as 
'disclose or abstain·. An insider who has price- ·ensiti e information that 
comes to him, or is generated by him, by reason of his position as an 
insider, should be prohibited from dealing or tipping until the information is 
published or is otherwise reflected in market prices. While he i - inhibited 
from disclosing, he should also be inhibited from dealing unless and until 
the market price has adjusted to reflect the information." 
When Part I of this Act is taken together with Part II of that same Act (generally referred to 
as the "Nominee Disclosure Provisions"), the provisions of the Securities Act 1978. the 
Securities Regulations 1983, the Securities Commission's proposals for takeover 
legislation,260 the Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the sharemarket 
(generally referred to as the "Russell Committee Report")
261 and the subsequent Report of 
the Sharemarket Inquiry Establishment Unit,262 the policy underlying New Zealand's 
securities263 legislation becomes clear ; namely to encourage investment in New Zealand's 
securities markets by promoting public disclosure of all relevant information in a timely 
manner. 264 The merits of such an approach are debatable in the sense that one may 
dispute the wisdom of such a policy and the benefits (if any) to be observed by legislating 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 
264 
Securities Commission, "Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice". above n. 2. Vol. I. 
para 3.1. 
Securities Commission. ··company Takeovers: Report to the Minister of Justice" (Wellington. 
1988). 
Ministerial Committee of Enquiry, "Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Sharemarket" 
(Wellington, 1988). 
Sharemarket Inquiry Establishment Unit, "Report of the Sharemarket [nquiry Establishment Unit" 
(Wellington, 1989). 
The term "security" is defined in section 2( I) of the Securities Act 1978. 
P. Ratner & C. Quinn. "Insider Trading". above n. 13, 1. 
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··fairne-- " in the markerplace. 20-- "Fairness". after all is a c ncept \\ hich like beaut: is in 
the eye of the beholder. Howe\ er. following the inrroducti n of the "'ecurities .\er in 1,r ., 
the :'\ew Zealand legi ·lature has repeatedly indicated that in the cru ·ial J.rena L-,f rhe m:.ir 
in which capital is rai ·ed by entitie · who engage in rhea ·ti\ iry of offering securities tL rhe 
public for ·ub ·cription. it i · important to promote the idea that Ne\\ Zea!Jnd · s securiric's 
markets are inherently fair in nature. "Fairnes ·" in this context means that the' same' 
information about securities. that are sub ·cribed f r or traded by the im esting public 
should be available to all participants. actual and potential. in the marker. :oc, 
The main provisions of the Act dealing with in ·icier rrading are contained in sections r 1 
14. In essence those provisions prohibit an insider from dealing or tipping
20- in securities 
of a public company in which the insider has inside information. 
The statutory definitions of the terms ·'inside information" and ''insider" are central tc the 
application of the Act. "Inside information" is defined as information. in relation to a 
public issuer, which is not publicly available. and which would, or would be lik:el to. 
affect the price of the securities if it were publicly available. 
268 That definition makes it 
clear that this proscription against insider trading only relates to public issuers. A "public 
issuer" is defined as a company or person that is, or that was at any time. a party to a listing 
agreement with a stock exchange.269 A ·'stock exchange" means the New Zealand tock 
Exchange and includes a stock exchange registered under the Sharebrokers Act 1908. 
270 
Hence, the insider trading provisions of the Act will only apply to trading, tipping and 
tippee trading in connection with companies that are or which have at any time been listed 
on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, so that unlisted private or closely held companies 
will be excluded from the scope of Part I of the Act. 
265 
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267 
268 
269 
270 
See. above n. 72. 
See, e.g., Securities Commission, "Proposed Recommendations for Security Regulations" 
(Wellington, 1980), para 3.3.6. 
Under sections 9(1) and 13(1) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 :m insider will he liahlc for 
"tipping" in circumstances where they have advised or encouraged :U1other person to ueaJ in the 
securities of a public issuer or alternatively where they have communicatell information or causeu 
infonnation to be disclosed to a person knowing or believing that person or another person will. or 
is likely to, deal in the ·ecurities of a public issuer. 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 s. 2. For a more lletailed analysis of this statutory uelinition of 
"inside information", see; E. Abernathy. P. Castle, J. Farrar. H. Strauss (eds), Andersons 
Company and Securities Law (Brooker & Friend Ltd. Wellington. 1991) Vol Ill. 11-1()4 - 11-105: 
P. Ratner & C. Quinn. Insider Trading, above n.13, 8-13: Securities Commission. "lnsiucr 
Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice". above n.2. Vol I. paras 6.1-6.5 . 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.2. 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.2. 
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In regard to those persons who may be categories as insiders for the purposes of 
establishing liability under the Act, the definition of an "insider" is extensive and is 
contained within section 3(1) of the Act which provides: 
"(l) For the purposes of Part I of this Act, "insider" in relation to a 
public issuer, means -
(a) The public issuer: 
(b) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an '>/' 
employee, or company secretary of, or a substantial security holder 
in, the public issuer, has inside information about the public issuer 
or another public issuer: 
(c) A person who receives inside information from a person described 
in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this subsection about the public 
issuer or another public issuer: 
(d) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an 
employee, or company secretary of, or a substantial security holder 
in, a person described in paragraph (c) of this subsection, has that 
inside information: 
(e) A person who receives inside information in confidence from a 
person described in paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) of this subsection 
about the public issuer or another public issuer: 
(f) A person who, by reason of being a principal officer, or an 
employee, or company secretary of, or a substantial security holder 
in, a person described in paragraph ( e) of this subsection, has that 
inside information. 
,, 
The definition of an "insider" is crucial to the application of the Act, as Part I of the Act will 
not be breached unless the information emanates from a person
271 connected with the 
public issuer in the manner prescribed by section 3( I). The key point to note in regard to 
271 Securities Amendment Act 1988 s.2: "'Person· includes a corporation sole. a company. or other 
body corporate (whether incorporated in New Zealand or elsewhere). an unincorporated body of 
persons, a public body. and a Government department." 
55 
the definition of an "insider" is that with the exception of the public issuer itself, to be an 
insider a person must possess inside information and have acquired it either: 
(1) By reason of their relationship with the issuer; or 
(2) ln confidence from an insider. 
Therefore, the definition of an "insider" incorporates a mixture of both fiduciary notions 
and proprietary rights in information. 
By virtue of this statutory definition in s.3(1) a public issuer will always be an insider of 
itself as any public issuer dealing in its own shares
272 would be the "most inside of 
insiders."273 The next category of insiders are those traditionally thought of as having 
fiduciary duties to the company, i.e., directors, company secretaries and employees. 
However, this proposition may be somewhat tenuous in the case of employees.
274 There 
is however a new category of persons who are now charged with a statutory duty towards 
their fellow shareholders; namely "substantial security holders"
275 (being persons holding 
a relevant interest in at least 5 percent of the voting securities of the public issuer
276). This 
definition of an "insider" will also cover persons who receive inside information "in 
confidence"277 from an insider (i.e., a secondary insider) and the confidants of those 
persons (i.e., a tertiary insider). 
272 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
However, given that the general rule under Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 is th
at a 
company may not purchase its own shares (note, however that there is a statutory exception to
 this 
general rule contained in s.66 of the Companies Act 1955); and that s.62 of the Companies
 Act 
1955 prevents a company from financially assisting any other person to acquire its shares, 
any 
further prohibition on a company was regarded as superfluous by the Securities Commission. 
See, 
Securities Commission, "Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice", above n.2, Vo
l. I, 
para 5.3. However, the fact that s.3(1) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 expressly incl
udes 
the public issuer within the definition of an "insider" may be an express recognition
 of 
Parliament's intention to relax the prohibition on a company dealing in its own securities. 
See. 
e.g., Companies Bill 1990 (as introduced into Parliament on 5 September 1990) clause 50. 
Broder v Dane 384 F. Supp 1312, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) per Cannella J. See also. P. Anism
an. 
Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and Alternatives, above n
.23, 
22. 
See, above n.87 and n.88. 
This proposition is somewhat less radical than it may first appear if it is kept in mind that
 the 
substantial security holder will only be treated as an "insider" in circumstances where they h
ave 
acquired inside information by reason of their relationship with the issuer. It is the writers opinion 
that there is something to be said for the idea that where securities are traded on a market 
that 
purports to require disclosure of all relevant information that investors who acquire large stake
s in 
a company ought not to have a right to better information about that company than fe
llow 
shareholders who have a relatively small stake in that company. 
Securities Amendment Act s.2. 
Whether information is imparted "in confidence" is a question of fact which depends ultima
tely 
upon the circumstances of each case. Certain relationships will automatically imply an obliga
tion 
of confidentiality, e.g .. that of a solicitor and their client. Otherwise confidentiality mus
t be 
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Therefore, the advisers and consultants (i.e., lawyers, accountants, sharebrokers, 
investment advisers, etc) of a public issuer or another insider would appear to be caught, in 
certain circumstances, by the statutory definition of an "insider". It must however be 
emphasised that in order for such advisers and consultants to qualify as insiders under 
s.3(1)(c) and s.3(1)(e) of the Act those persons must receive the information "in 
confidence."278 Thus, a financial analyst may not be caught by this definition as there is 
some doubt as to whether or not information imparted to a financial analyst by an insider is r J 
given "in confidence". For in most cases financial information given to financial analysts 
(even if it is price-sensitive non-public information) is given with the intention or 
expectation that the analyst will disclose that information to others. 
279 By way of 
comparison, it is interesting to observe that in the case of SEC v Dirks
280 the United States 
Supreme Court held that a financial analyst of a broker dealer firm who received inside 
information from a corporate insider concerning the fact that a particular company's assets 
were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent financial practices, did not breach the 
provisions of Rule 1 Ob-5281 by disclosing that inside information to clients of their firm 
and other investors who consequently sold their shareholdings in that company before the 
scandal was publicly disclosed. One of the reasons that the Supreme Court provided for 
its decision was that the financial analyst did not receive the information "in confidence", as 
the corporate insider had communicated this information to the analyst for the purposes of 
exposing the fraudulent activity.282 The Court also emphasised the fact that the analyst did 
not personally benefit from the disclosure of such information.
283 
The Act imposes liability upon persons that may be classed as insiders who breach the 
provisions of the Act relating to insider trading within sections 7, 9, 11 and 13.
284 An 
278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
283 
284 
shown to arise from the nature of the communication and whether it was imparted in circumsta
nces 
importing an obligation of confidence. See above, n.193. 
See, above n.277. 
See, P. Ratner and C. Quinn, Insider Trading, above n.13, 11. Note, however, that an insider who 
discloses inside information to a financial analyst knowing or believing the analyst or ano
ther 
person will, or is likely to, trade on that inside infonnation may be in breach of s.9( I )(b) o
f the 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 for the act of "tipping". Unlike tippee trading, liability
 for 
tipping is not conditioned upon the disclosure of the infonnation being for a confidential purp
ose. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.9(1). 
463 US 646 (1983). For further discussion on this decision. see, above n.163. 
Promulgated under § I Ob of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. 
463 us 646, 656-657 ( 1983). 
463 us 646, 657 ( 1983). 
However, under the Securities Amendment Act 1988 there are a number of exceptions to liab
ility 
under the insider trading provisions. Firstly. there is the so-called "Chinese Wall" exception w
hich 
is recognised in sections 10, 12(2) and 14 of the Act. This exception provides that no action
 can 
be brought against an insider of the public issuer under the Act where arrangements exist to en
sure 
that no person who made the decision to buy or sell securities, or advised others in connec
tion 
with the purchase or sale of securities. received. or had access to, inside infonnation or 
was 
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insider who deals in the securities of a public issuer while possessing inside informa
tion is 
liable under s.7 to the public issuer itself, or to the persons with whom they deal.
 That 
liability is extended under s.9 to the "tipping" situation in circumstances where the i
nsider 
advises or encourages another person to buy or sell securities, or advises or encou
rages 
that person to advise or encourage some third person to buy or sell the secu
rities. 
Similarly, the insider will be liable if the insider communicates the information or c
auses 
the information to be disclosed to a person knowing or believing that person or an
other 
person, will, or is likely to, deal in the securities, or advise or encourage some third
 party 
to deal in the securities. 
A parallel set of provisions applies under sections 11 and 13 to the situation in wh
ich an 
insider of a public issuer has obtained inside information about another public issu
er and 
subsequently engages in dealing or tipping in relation to the securities of that other 
public 
issuer. Therefore, an insider of public issuer A who has inside information about a
nother 
public issuer B and who deals or tips in relation to the securities of public issuer B, w
ill be 
liable to the person with whom they deal or to public issuer A. It is important to ob
serve 
however that in order for their to be liability the person concerned must first be an ins
ider in 
relation to public issuer A within the meaning of s.3(1). 
However, it must be pointed out that an insider will not be liable under the prov
isions 
referred to in the preceding paragraphs if the insider uses inside information in a de
cision 
not to purchase or not to sell securities of a public issuer in respect of which the insid
er has 
influenced by a person who had inside information about the public issuer; and
 no person who 
took part in the decision to buy or sell securities, or who advised others in conn
ection with the 
sale or purchase of securities, received, or had access to, inside information about 
the public issuer 
or was influenced by a person who had inside infonnation about the public iss
uer. Secondly, 
section 8( 1) of the Act provides that no action may be brought against a dir
ector, company 
secretary or employee of a public issuer for insider trading under s. 7 if: 
(a) that person deals in the securities in that person's own name or in the na
me, or on behalf 
of that person's spouse or child; and 
(b) that person complies with a procedure operated by the public issuer for 
ensuring that no 
director, company secretary or employee who has inside information about the
 public 
issuer's securities uses that information in dealing in those securities for persona
l gain; 
and 
(c) the procedure is approved by the Securities Commission by notice in the Gazette: an
d 
(d) the Commission has not withdrawn that approval. 
See, The Insider Trading (Approved Procedure for Company Officers) Notice 1991
 made pursuant 
to s.8(l)(c) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. Thirdly. an exception also 
exists in respect 
of a formal takeover offer made in accordance with s.4 of the Companies Amend
ment Act 1963. 
See sections 7(2) and 12(1) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. Fourth
ly, there is an 
exemption contained in s.12(3) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 by whi
ch an insider is 
exempted from liability under s.11 (3) of that Act if the insider first obtains the
 con ent of the 
public issuer of which they are an insider, for the purchase or sale of securitie
s in that public 
issuer. 
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inside information, or where the insider uses that inside information to tip others not to buy 
or not to sell securities of that public issuer.285 
Under the insider trading provisions of the Act an insider may be liable to the public issuer 
in relation to which they are an insider and the persons with whom they or their tippee have 
traded.286 The quantum of damages is set as the amount of the gain made or loss avoided 
by the insider or tippee.287 The gain or loss is calculated by comparing the value of the 
securities at the time of the dealing by the insider with the value the securities would have 
had if the inside information used by the insider had been publicly known.
2 88 
Furthermore, the public issuer may recover from the insider an additional pecuniary penalty 
imposed by the High Court of an amount up to three times the value of the gain made or the 
loss avoided by the insider, or the consideration paid for the securities.
289 
The Act expressly recognises that it may be potentially difficult to enforce any such 
proscription against insider trading as directors of a public issuer may be reluctant (for 
whatever reason) to bring any such action against an insider in the name of the 
company. 290 Hence, Part I of the Act equips members of a public issuer with two 
important procedural advantages. Firstly, a shareholder who considers that the public 
issuer has or may have the right to sue an insider may, with the prior approval of the 
Securities Commission, require the public issuer at its own expense to obtain an opinion 
from a barrister or solicitor approved by the Commission, as to whether or not the public 
issuer has a cause of action against the insider. 291
 The ability to require the public issuer 
to obtain such an opinion is enjoyed not only by present members of the public issuer but 
also by past members who were shareholders at the time the insider trading was alleged to 
have occurred.292 Secondly, any one or more of the same members may themselves, with 
the leave of the High Court,293 exercise the public issuer's right of action against an 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
293 
Presumably, the policy reason for this is that there will be few (if any) persons harmed in t
hose 
circumstances. The other, and more practical reason, is the virtual impossibility of provin
g in 
most cases that any such decision was ever made by an insider. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss. 7(2), 9(2), 11(2) and 13(2). 
See. Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss. 7(2), 9(2), 11(2) and 13(2). 
See. Securities Amendment Act 1988 sl5. 
See. Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss. 7(4), 9(4), 11(4), 13(4) and 16. 
See, Securities Commission. "Insider Trading: Report to the Minister of Justice". above n.2,
 Vol 
I, paras l l.10.4. - l l.10.5 . 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.17(1). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.17(2). 
The High Court may only refuse leave to bring an action if the public issuer does not have an 
arguable case against the insider, or there is good reason for not bringing the action. The H
igh 
Court must give leave for members to take over proceedings commenced by a public issuer un
less 
it is satisfied that the public issuer is conducting the proceedings in a proper manner or then
:: is 
good reason for not continuing the proceedings. See. Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss.1
8(2) 
,md 18(4). 
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insider294 or take over the conduct of proceedings already commenced by the pub
lic is ' uer 
against the insider. 295 Furthermore, costs incurred in bringing or continuing
 such an 
action in place of the public issuer are to be borne by the public issuer rather
 than the 
individual movant.296 
As regards any monetary relief recovered by a public is uer in an action against a
n insider, 
such funds are to be held on trust for distribution in accordance with the directio
ns of the 
court. 297 The Court may direct that the amount recovered shall be either retain
ed by the 
public issuer, 298 or distributed to: 
• any other person who has also obtained, or satisfies the court that th
ey could 
obtain, a judgement against the insider in respect of the same transaction:
299 
• any member of the public issuer:300 
• any person who, at the time the securities were brought or sold, was a m
ember of 
the public issuer.301 
In circumstances where both the public issuer and another person obtain jud
gements 
against the insider in respect of the same transaction, the court must give pr
iority to 
satisfying the other person's judgement out of the moneys recovered by th
e public 
issuer.302 Finally, the court must ensure that in giving directions as to the distri
bution of 
any amount recovered by the public issuer from an insider, no part of those funds
 are paid 
to, or for, the benefit of that insider.303 
294 
295 
296 
297 
298 
299 
300 
301 
302 
303 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. l 8(1 ). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.18(3) . 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.18(5). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.19(1). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. l 9(2)(b). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.19(2)( I )(i) and (ii). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s. l 9(2)(a)(iii). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.l 9(2)(a)(iv). 
This would also apply where the court is satisfied that the other person in questi
on "could obtain 
judgement in a claim against the insider". See. Securities Amendment Act 1988 s
. I 9(3). 
Securities Amendment Act 1988 s. 19(5). Therefore. where the insider in questio
n is a member of 
the public issuer the court may be hesitant to allow the public issuer to retain any
 funds recovered 
from that insider as theoretically any payment to the public issuer would find its w
ay back to (i.e., 
benefit) the insider. in their capacity as a member of that public issuer. See. abov
e n.? 
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However, financial liability under the Act is not the only disincentive for insider trading that 
was introduced by the Legislature in 1988. For, under the recently introduced s.188A
304 
of the Companies Act 19 55 a person shall not be a director, promoter or manager of a 
company where a judgement has been obtained under Part I of the Securities Amendment 
Act 1988 against that person as an insider, during the period of five years after the 
judgement, unless that person first obtains the leave of the High Court.
305 
304 
305 
This provision was introduced by the Companies Amendment Act 1988. No. 236. s.3( l ). Section 
188A came into force on 21 December 1988, effective ly substituting the fo nner s. 188A of the 
Companies Act I 955. 
Companies Act 1955 s. 188A(l )(c) . 
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PART V 
5. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing examination of Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 has m
ade it 
apparent that many of the various problems and limitations which have tradit
ionally 
characterised pre-existing common law constraints on insider trading have to some
 extent 
been addressed by Parliament with the introduction of this legislative scheme. Th
us, by 
way of conclusion it would be helpful to discuss the various means by which the st
atutory 
solutions provided under the Act have extended the scope of possible civil causes of
 action 
against persons indulging in insider trading within New Zealand's securities markets
. 
The fact that a much broader range of persons may now be liable under the Act fo
r their 
insider trading or tipping activities than would otherwise be the case under comm
on law 
actions for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence may be demonstrated
 by the 
following examination of an insider trading type scenario.30
6 
306 
Example 
Company B wishes to acquire a controlling parcel of shares in Company A 
from Company C. Company A is a party to a listing agreement with the 
This example has been drawn from a similar such example discussed in; Securi
ties Commission, 
"Proposed Practice Note on Insider Trading; A Discussion Paper" (Wellington, 
1992), para 3.24. 
The discussion of the example within this paper will be for the sole purpose of d
emonstrating the 
broad range of persons who may be caught by the statutory definition of an "ins
ider" in s.3( I) of 
the Securities Amendment Act 1988. Hence, there will be no discussion wit
hin this paper in 
regard to the perplexing question of whether or not a public issuer that willingl
y allows another 
party to become aware of inside infonnation about that company by means of due 
diligence, for the 
purpose of facilitating a transaction in that issuers securities. can subsequently 
initiate an action 
against that party for insider trading under Part I of the Securities Amend
ment Act 1988. 
However, the Securities Commission in discussing a similar such example 
in its "Proposed 
Practice Note on Insider Trading; A Discussion Paper:· above n.306. appears to 
suggest at paras. 
3.24 and 3.27 that; such a situation would involve "no infonnational disadvantag
e as between the 
contracting parties, no disadvantage to the public issuer, no malpractice or ge
nerally unethical 
behaviour, and no transactional disadvantage to any other shareholder other perhap
s than the lack of 
an opportunity to participate in the particular transaction in tenns of which may b
e more attractive 
than those applying in the market." Thus, by reading between the lines of thi
s publication the 
writer is left with the impression that in the hypothetical situation discuss
ed at para 3.24 
concerning '·due diligence," the Securities commission is likely to decline
 a request by a 
shareholder under s.17 for approval to require the public issuer (e.g., Company
 A in the above 
example, above n.306) to obtain a legal opinion on the question of whether o
r not the public 
issuer has a cause of action against an insider. It should also be pointed out that in 
regard to a 
members ability to exercise or take over the public issuer's right of action under
 s.18 of the Act. 
the member must obtain the leave of the Court. Therefore. it is possible that
 a Court may be 
satisfied that it has sufficient grounds to refuse such leave to a member on the
 basis that under 
ss.18(2)(b) and 18(4)(b) ''there is good reason for not'' bringing the action o
r continuing the 
proceeding. 
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New Zealand Stock Exchange, however, the prospecti e purcha er 
(Company B) is a private unlisted company. Company Cha appointed a 
nominee as a director of A and that director has communicated inside 
information about Company A to C. In order to ascertain whether 
Company C's asking price was a fair one, Company B requested a grant of 
due diligence from Company A. The board of directors of Company A 
resolved after due consideration to grant ·'due diligence" to Company B so 
as to facilitate the purchase by B from Company C. The directors of A had 
disclosed relevant interests prior to considering the matter, intere ted 
directors refrained from voting on the resolution and the evidence shows 
that the resolution is not "tainted" in any way. The "due diligence" proces 
conducted by Company B involved a detailed examination of price-sensitive 
information about Company A (e.g., present and pending contracts and 
commitments concerning Company A, that company's financial figures and 
forecasts etc) which had not been publicly disclosed. Company B and 
Company C subsequently completed the share transaction after arduous 
negotiations at a price significantly different to that applying on the market. 
In this hypothetical situation it may be deduced that companies A, B, and C are all 
potentially liable as "insiders" under Part I of the Securities Amendment Act 198
8. 
Information obtained by Company B in the course of due diligence i price sensitive
 and 
not publicly available, thereby Company B must be regarded as having received "in
side 
information."307 Therefore, Company B is an insider by virtue of having obtained in
side 
information from the public issuer (i.e., Company A) "in confidence. "
308 Hence, 
Company B may possibly be liable under the Act for purchasing shares in C
ompany A 
while being in possession of inside information.
309 Company A as the public issuer of the 
securities that were traded by B and C may also be categorised as an "insider" unde
r the 
statutory definition of that term.
310 Thus, Company A may possibly be liable for 
"tipping" Company B, as Company A communicated inside information to B in
 the course 
of due diligence with the knowledge that B would purchase securities from Company C.
311 
Furthermore, Company C may be regarded as an insider as it obtained inside i
nformation 
by reason of its position as a substantial security holder in Company A
312(i.e., it obtained 
307 
308 
309 
310 
3 I I 
312 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.2. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.3(l)(c). Assuming of course. t
hat information 
communicated in the course of due diligence is to be regarded as having hcen given
 ;uid received "in 
confidence" for the purpose of s.3( l)(c) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. 7(1 )(a). 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988, s.3( I )(a). 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.9( 1 )(b)(i). 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. 3(1 )(b). 
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inside information from the nominee director it appointed to the board of Com
pany A). 
Thus, it is possible that Company C may be liable under the Act for selling its c
ontrolling 
parcel of shares to Company B while being in possession of inside information.31
3 
In turning to consider the possibility of civil liability under the common law a
ctions for 
breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty it becomes apparent tha
t a much 
narrower range of persons would attract liability. In the context of an action fo
r a breach 
of confidence based on the general equitable jurisdiction
314 it appears to be obvious that 
Company A has no cause of action against Company B as the inside inform
ation was 
received by B (in the course of due diligence) for the limited purpose of de
termining 
whether or not to purchase the shares from Company C. Thus, in the circumstances as 
set 
out in the above example, Company B has not used the inside information for an
y purpose 
other than that for which it was confided. Therefore, it would follow that Comp
any B has 
not breached any obligation of confidence by purchasing shares from Company
 C on the 
basis of this inside information.315 However, as regards the nominee director, 
it may be 
assumed that inside information communicated to a director is usually im
parted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence which requires a director to 
utilise the 
information for the limited purpose of performing their functions as a director.
316 Thus, 
the actions of the director in "tipping" Company C may constitute an actionable
 breach of 
confidence. Moreover, Company C, who assumedly obtained this inside in
formation 
from the nominee director with actual knowledge or notice of the fact that it w
as being 
received under a breach of confidence, may perhaps also be liable to Company A
 as a third 
party recipient of such confidential information.
317 In considering the possible application 
of the fiduciary duty approach it would seem clear that Company B will attract no suc
h 
liability as B would not be considered to be in a fiduciary relationship with Company 
A or 
its shareholders.318 It would also seem that company C, who is a mere share
holder in 
Company A, would not generally be classified as a fiduciary of Company
 A or its 
shareholders.319 However, the nominee director appointed by Company C is 
obviously 
in a fiduciary relationship with Company A. Thus, by the act of comm
unicating 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
119 
See, Securities Amendment Act I 988, s. 7(1 )(b). 
See, above n.180. 
See, above n.193 . 
See, above n.202. 
See, above n.226. 
See, above n.92. 
Sec, L.H. Leigh, Y.H. Joffe & D. Goldberg, Norr hey & Leigh' s lnrroducrion ro Compan
y Law (3 
ed., Bulterworths, London, 1983) 199-201. 
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confidential information to Company C that director may well incur liability to Company A
 
for a breach of their fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company.3
20 
Therefore, the examination of this example has served to demonstrate the fact that Part I of
 
the Securities Amendment Act 1988 has imposed potential liability upon a much broader 
range of persons that may have the opportunity to trade on inside information or engage in 
"tipping" than is the case under the pre-existing common law causes of action for breach of
 
fiduciary duty and breach of confidence. It would therefore be true to say that the Act has
 
solved one of the major failings of those pre-existing common law causes of action that has
 
been identified with this paper.321 However, the fact that such a wide scope of persons
 
may be categorised as "insiders" under the Act gives rise to the risk that this legislation may
 
possibly operate to prohibit certain activities which are viewed as commercially desirable
 
within New Zealand's securities markets (e.g., the practice of "due diligence" (as carried
 
out by Company B in the above example322) being conducted in relation to a particular 
company's financial affairs, by potential purchasers of a large holding of that company's
 
securities, assuming of course that such an activity is to be viewed as commercially
 
desirable). The legislature has however attempted to mitigate such a risk in many respects
 
by including numerous exceptions to liability under the insider trading provisions of the
 
Act.323 
In regard to the remedies for insider trading a certain similarity may be detected between
 
Part I of the Act and the pre-existing common law causes of action by reason of the fact that
 
the Act focuses its principal deterrent and compensatory efforts through the rights of the
 
public issuer whose securities were traded by the insider.
324 This observation is based on 
the fact that, with its broad proscription against persons indulging in insider trading or
 
tipping, the Act accords the public issuer a right of action against the insider for the gain
 
that insider has garnered.325 Additionally, the issuer may also recover a fairly sizeable
 
penalty, up to the greater of the price of the securities traded or treble the insider trading
 
profits.326 To be sure, the Act also accords contemporaneous traders who purchased from 
or sold to the insider (hereafter referred to as "contemporaneous traders") a right to recover
 
any gain they were deprived of, or any loss incurred, because of the insider 's failure to 
320 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
See also, J. Farrar & M. Russell, Company Law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand. above 
n.22. 228-229. 
See, above n.25. 
See, above n.306. 
See, above n.284. 
See, J.D. Cox, "An Economic Perspective of Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement in N
ew 
Zealand", above n.43, 279. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. ss. 7(2), 9(2), l 1(2) and 13(2). 
See. Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. 7(4). 
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disclose before trading.327 However, because this civil remedy will never exceed more 
than the profits the insider wrongfully obtained or the loss they have illegally avoided, the 
contemporaneous trader's remedy should be viewed as secondary to that of the public 
issuer.328 Such reasoning is further reinforced by s.19 of the Act which provides that any 
sums recovered through the public issuer's action against an insider may be distributed by 
the High Court to contemporaneous traders, members of the public issuer and other 
persons who could obtain a judgement against the insider in respect of the same 
transaction. Hence, this provision would appear to recognise the primacy of the issuer's 
action against insiders while at the same time appreciating that insider trading may visit 
financial loss upon others. 
While it may be said that the public issuer is granted the primary remedy against an insider 
it must, however, also be recognised that Part I of the Act has sought to overcome one of 
the main difficulties which has been identified with common law causes of action in the 
context of insider trading; namely the ability of individual shareholders of the issuer and 
contemporaneous traders (who may or may not be current members of the issuer) to initiate 
proceedings against persons indulging in insider trading or tipping.
329 As pointed out 
previously, this has been achieved under the Act by supplementing the possibility of 
proceedings initiated by the public issuer with the prospect of a private action by a 
contemporaneous trader who has been a "victim" of such insider trading.
330 In addition, 
the public issuer may be indirectly stimulated to initiate an action to impose the pecuniary 
penalty against an insider as a member of the public issuer or contemporaneous trader may 
under section 17 of the Act, with the prior approval of the Securities Commission, cause 
the issuer to secure an opinion of a barrister or solicitor approved by the Commission as to 
whether or not the issuer has a cause of action for insider trading. Certainly, if the 
consulted barrister or solicitor renders a positive reaction to the allegations the board of 
directors of that public issuer would be hard pressed not to proceed with such an action.
331 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988. s. 7(2)(a) and (b). 
It would appear that mere disgorgement of profits garnered or losses avoided will provide a very 
mild disincentive for insider trading as an insider is hardly worse off by trading on in
side 
information and being reprimanded in terms of having to disgorge any financial advantage obta
ined 
from such transactions. than where they abstained from trading on the inside informa
tion 
altogether. See, J .D. Cox, "An Economic Perspective of Insider Trading Regulation and 
Enforcement in New Zealand", above n.43, 279-280. 
See, above n.251. 
See, Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss.7(2), 9(2), 11(2) and 13(2). 
This observation is made in light of the fiduciary duty of directors to act bona fide in the inte
rests 
of the company. See. J. Farrar & M. Russell. Company Law and Securities Regulation in New 
Zealand, above n.22, 228-229. Thus, directors who fail to proceed with such an action agains
t an 
insider in circumstances where a legal opinion obtained under section 17 of the Secur
ities 
Amendment Act I 988 has detennined that the company has a good chance of success in an ac
tion 
against an insider, may not be acting in the "best interests" of the company. However, 
it is 
possible that the board of directors may argue that it would not be in the "best interests of
 the 
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~1oreoYer. ·e ·tion 1 ~ of the . .\et permit' the High Count gr:int stJnding tL J persL n ,, h ~ 
was a member of the public i -- uer Jt the time the securitie: ,, ere tL:ded·'-': lf J
 
comemporaneou - rrader to prose ·ure the public issuer· s cJuse f :iction Jg.1inst the insi ier.
 
The advantage · of initiating ·uch an .. issuer ba ·ed .. Jcti nun ier s. l c' include the fact thJt 
the co ·ts of litigation incurred by the movant are to be Jbs rbed by the public issuer. .rnd
 
that the remedy a ailable i not ·imply di ·gorgement of the insider's profic. bur the gre:iter
 
of the price of the securities rraded or three times the value of the profits garnered by the 
insider. Therefore. by providing a mechanism by which contemporane us rraders .1nd
 
members of the public issuer (at the time the ·ecuritie - were tr:ided) may enforce the
 
issuer· s primary remedy against an insider and ha e their legal fees paid for by that public 
issuer. Part I of the Act contains an important incenti e for pri ate enforcement of the
 
proscriptions contained within that Act. 
By way of conclusion it must be emphasised, however, that while the arious remedies and
 
the breadth of coverage provided under Part I of the Securities Amendment et 1988 may
 
initially appear to overshadow and obviate the need for common law causes of action in the
 
context of insider trading, it is to be realised that this Act is not of universal application as it
 
only prohibits insider trading and tipping activities relating to the securities of a listed public
 
company.333 Therefore, those common law causes of action that have been discussed at
 
length within this paper will continue to have application and relevance in regard to
 
instances of insider trading and tipping which occur in the securities of unlisted private or
 
closely held companies in New Zealand. Therefore, Part l of the Securities Amendment
 
Act 1988 should not be depicted as having provided a complete solution to those problems
 
which manifest themselves when problems arising from insider trading activities are sought
 
to be remedied by means of reliance upon the common law causes of action for breach of
 
fiduciary duty and breach of confidence.33
4 
332 
333 
334 
company" to proceed with such an action as it may "cast a cloud on the corporation·s name. 
inJure 
stockholder relations and undennine public regard for the corporation ·s securities .. ; Dia1110
11d 1· 
Oreamuno 248 NE 2d 910. 912 (1969), per Fuld C.J. 
See. Securities Amendment Act 1988. s.18(l)(b). 
See, C. Quinn. "The Securities Amendment Act 1988 and the Chinese Wall" ( 1989) 7 Ota
go L. 
Rev. 141, 141. 
However, the Companies Bill I 990. which intends to provide coverage in relation to hoth p
uhlic 
and private companies. proposes to cover some of the ground that has been already hcen cover
ed by 
Part I of the Securities Amendment Act I 988 (which only cover puhlicly listed companies)
; sec. 
above n.16 for a discussion of the relevant clauses of the Companies Bill 1990 in the conte
xt of 
insider trading. It must be pointed out however that there is no such provision withi
n thc 
Companies Bill 1990 for any pecuniary penalty to be recovered against ;ui insider. such a
s that 
provided under Part I of the Securities Amendment Act in favour of the public issuer (ss.7(2).
 9(2). 
11(2). and 13(2)), and which is also available in certain circumstances to members of the r
uhlic 
issuer under s. 18. 
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